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Executive summary 
 
The Scarborough, Whitby and Ryedale (SWR) Street Triage service was funded for 12 
months by the Department of Health as one of nine pilots in England. Street triage was 
introduced to bridge a gap between police and NHS mental health services, and to help 
reduce the number of detentions under s.136 Mental Health Act 1983. 
This evaluation used both qualitative and quantitative methods within a co-production 
framework involving the University of York (UoY), North Yorkshire Police (NYP) and Tees, Esk 
and Wear Valleys NHS Foundation Trust (TEWV). While UoY researchers led the evaluation, 
key stakeholders from NYP and TEWV co-designed the study; helped to shape the research 
questions; suggested key informants to interview; and provided access to respondents. 
Additionally, a senior data analyst from TEWV extracted data from the TEWV PARIS 
database and supported the data analysis processes. Evaluation methods used were 
individual and focus group interviews with key informants from NYP, TEWV and other local 
agencies in the SWR region, and analysis of routinely collected data by the Street Triage 
service for the pilot and data held in the TEWV PARIS database. 
46 key informants were interviews in individual and group interviews. They provided a very 
positive account of the SWR Street Triage service from the perspective of both the police 
and NHS mental health services. This was corroborated by other local agencies. They 
described the service as a bridge between the police and NHS mental health services, 
providing support to the police in their work with people with mental health problems. The 
involvement of the SWR Street Triage service helped to de-escalate crisis situations and find 
non-custodial options for people experiencing mental distress. It freed up police officers to 
attend other incidents and signposted people towards other more appropriate services 
which could provide suitable help. Over the course of the pilot, the relationship between 
police officers and Street Triage practitioners strengthened so that information was shared 
about people coming to the attention of the police before crises occurred and preventive 
interventions were undertaken. Interviewees were unable to find any reasons why the 
service should not continue beyond its initial pilot funding period. 
The introduction of the Street Triage service was not associated with a reduction in the 
number of s.136 detentions in the SWR region, though the rates were already low. Analysis 
of 524 referrals to the service during the pilot found that over 80% of referrals were of 
people known to mental health services but only 41% had an active care plan. Many did not 
reach the threshold for secondary mental health services and were referred to other 
appropriate services after Street Triage involvement. Referral data supported perspectives 
offered during the qualitative interviews that it was a misnomer to name the service ‘Street’ 
Triage as 75% of contacts occurred in individual’s homes rather than public places. For the 
first 308 street triage users there was a reduction in the use of TEWV community services 
after the first contact with the Street Triage service, but an increase in inpatient admissions. 
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This suggests that the team were successfully diverting people away from NHS mental 
health services who did not need it, but it was on the pathway to admission for others who 
did. 
This evaluation was small in scale, it lacked control groups for comparison and it did not 
include the experiences of service users and carers. The analysis of routinely recorded data 
was hampered by missing data and the lack of prospective data collection limited the 
availability of outcome data. However, this evaluation provides a very positive account of 
the pilot year of operation of the SWR Street Triage service and recommends that it receives 
additional funding to ensure it can provide a full and consistent service in the locality. 
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1 Introduction 
This report presents the findings of an evaluation of a Street Triage pilot in Scarborough, 
Whitby and Ryedale (SWR). The SWR Street Triage service was one of nine Department of 
Health funded pilots announced in 2013 by Home Secretary Teresa May and Minister for 
Care and Support Norman Lamb. The SWR pilot ran from 24th March 2014 to 23rd March 
2015 and was delivered in partnership by Tees, Esk and Wear Valleys NHS Foundation Trust 
(TEWV) and North Yorkshire Police (NYP). 
1.1 Origins of Street Triage and UK context 
Street Triage refers to schemes where mental health professionals are available to advise 
and support police officers on incidents where an individual appears to be in mental health 
crisis. Street Triage has its origin in the United States. In 1988 in Memphis Tennessee, the 
fatal shooting of a young male who was in the midst of mental health crisis led to the 
development of the Crisis Intervention Team (CIT) approach. CIT is primarily a police training 
programme, “designed to educate and prepare law enforcement officers to recognise the 
signs and symptoms of mental illness and to respond effectively and appropriately to the 
individual in crisis” (Ralph, 2010). The programme – known as the ‘Memphis Model’ – 
comprises 40 hours of police officer training, with officers usually participating on a 
voluntary basis (i.e. it is not part of core officer training). CIT has spread across the USA, with 
recent estimates of over 400 programmes now in operation. A core set of ‘essential 
elements’ underpin CIT, but the model has been adapted to meet local contexts and 
resources (Watson et al, 2008). 
Street Triage has come to the fore in the UK in response to concerns that the powers under 
Section 136 of the Mental Health Act (MHA) 1983 were being over-used. Section 136 grants 
police officers powers to remove to a ‘place of safety’ an individual found in a public place 
who appears to be in mental health crisis and at risk of harming themselves or others: 
If a constable finds in a place to which the public have access a person who appears to him 
to be suffering from mental disorder and to be in immediate need of care or control, the 
constable may, if he thinks it necessary to do so in the interests of that person or for the 
protection of other persons, remove that person to a place of safety within the meaning of 
section 135 above (Mental Health Act 1983, Section 136) 
The purpose of removing the individual to a place of safety is expressly in order that they 
can be assessed by an Approved Mental Health Professional and a section 12 approved 
medical practitioner so that appropriate care and treatment can be arranged. Significantly, 
persons detained under s.136 have not necessarily committed any crime – yet the use of 
s.136 is, in effect, an arrest of the individual, temporarily depriving them of their liberty.  
A place of safety in this context may include a hospital or other healthcare setting, local 
social services accommodation, the home of a relative or friend who is willing to temporarily 
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receive the individual, or a police station. The MHA Code of Practice states that a police 
station should be used as a place of safety ‘only on an exceptional basis’. However, concerns 
have been raised that police stations were being used on an inappropriate and far too 
frequent basis to detain individuals detained under s.136, and there have been several calls 
to significantly reduce this practice (e.g. HMIC, HMIP, CQC and HIW, 2013; Department of 
Health and Home Office, 2014; HM Government, 2014; House of Commons Home Affairs 
Committee, 2015). Police stations are seen as inappropriate settings in which to 
accommodate people in mental health crisis both in terms of the (mis)use of police 
resources – where no crime has been committed – and in terms of the additional distress 
brought upon the individual by inappropriate accommodation and the implication of 
criminality. The opening of ‘health-based places of safety’ (sometimes referred to as s.136 
Suites) has accompanied a reduction in use of police cells to detain people in mental health 
crisis. However, rates of s.136 detention in police custody are still considered unacceptably 
high. 
In May 2013, Home Secretary Theresa May announced four Street Triage pilots, funded by 
Department of Health and backed by the Home Office. Four months later, five further DH-
funded pilots were announced by the then Care and Support Minister Norman Lamb1. At the 
time of writing, there are several additional pilots being run across the UK funded through 
local resources. 
The primary aims of Street Triage in the UK context can be seen as threefold: 
 To reduce the use of s.136 of the Mental Health Act 
 To reduce the amount of police resources devoted to dealing with mental health 
incidents 
 To improve the speed and appropriateness of assessment, care and treatment 
provided to individuals in mental health crisis – including referral into other services 
and follow-up care 
The Department of Health has conducted an evaluation covering all nine of the DH-funded 
pilots, with results expected to be published in autumn 2015.  
1.2 Models of Street Triage 
Different models of street triage exist. As a police training programme, the foundational CIT 
programme (outlined above) differs from the model that has been more commonly 
implemented in the UK, whereby mental health nurses bring their professional expertise 
into a partnership working arrangement alongside police officers. Deane et al (1999) 
                                                          
1
 The nine police forces involved in the DH-funded pilots are: North Yorkshire, Devon and Cornwall, Sussex, 
Derbyshire followed by the Metropolitan Police, British Transport Police, West Yorkshire, West Midlands and 
Thames Valley   
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distinguish three strategies by which police may approach the handling of mental health 
issues:   
1. Police-based police response: specialist officers who have received specific training 
in mental health 
2. Police-based mental health response: mental health professionals employed by and 
based within police departments 
3. Mental health-based mental health response: community mental health services 
that have formed a specific relationship with the police department to respond at 
the site of an incident (mobile crisis teams) 
Schemes currently operating in the UK appear predominantly to have adopted the third 
approach, whereby mental health nurses are ‘on call’ to police officers and available to 
provide either at-the-scene or over the telephone advice and assistance in assessing an 
individual in distress. There are also some UK Street Triage services which resemble the 
second model, or a slightly amended version, for example, mental health professionals co-
located with but not necessarily employed by the police. In some localities, a ‘triage car’ 
operates, with the mental health and police personnel located together in a mobile unit for 
the duration of a given shift. Some schemes also include a paramedic within the core triage 
team. 
1.3 The Scarborough, Whitby, Ryedale Pilot 
The DH-funded pilot was the first time any type of Street Triage service had been 
implemented in the SWR area. In designing the operating model for the pilot, there was 
some consultation with the team that had established a Street Triage pilot in Cleveland in 
August 2012. That partnership had also involved Tees, Esk and Wear Valleys NHS 
Foundation Trust (TEWV) – in this instance the Teesside locality working with Cleveland 
Police. TEWV’s established involvement in the Cleveland pilot was one factor in selecting the 
Scarborough, Whitby, Ryedale area for the DH pilot, as a model for the partnership was 
already in place. Although within the North Yorkshire Police Force region, the City of York 
had the highest level of demand in terms of mental health, there were seen to be practical 
advantages in running the DH pilot in an area of the Force where working links with the NHS 
Mental Health Trust were already established. 
Box 1.1 below gives a summary of the initial Street Triage operating model in the SWR 
locality. Each aspect of the model is discussed in more detail in Chapter 3 including changes 
to the original model which were made in the course of the pilot year.  
To a large extent, the operating model in SWR mirrored that of the Cleveland pilot. 
However, there were some important differences. Firstly, whereas dedicated operational or 
strategic managers had been appointed in Cleveland, the SWR pilot did not have the 
resources to support such posts. As such, these roles were unfunded add-ons to the roles of 
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existing service managers within TEWV. The Cleveland team also had more established links 
with local police and already delivered services around offender health. Finally, there 
operational differences were anticipated, given the more rural and dispersed geography of 
the SWR area in comparison to the more urban and centralised Teesside locality. 
Box 1.1 Street Triage Initial Operating Model in Scarborough, Whitby and Ryedale 
Staffing 
 
Two Band 6 mental health nurses 
Two Band 3 Community Support Workers 
(One Band 6 and one Band 3 staffing any given shift) 
Hours of operation 
 
3.00pm to 1.00am, 7 days per week 
Base location  
 
Dedicated office at Cross Lane Hospital (Scarborough) 
Deployment processes and transportation  
 
Police request Street Triage via Force Control Room 
Triage team travel from hospital base to incident in 
unmarked vehicle 
Vehicle equipped for hands-free use of police radio 
Communication and information sharing  
 
Use of police radios linked into police airwave 
Mobile phones 
Direct access to PARIS patient information system 
No direct access to police NICHE records system, but 
police clearance for NICHE information to be shared 
with Triage team 
Eligibility criteria 
 
No exclusions – all ages, all circumstances 
 
Research participants noted some characteristics of the population particular to the SWR 
locality. This included the high number of people who would come to seaside towns when 
contemplating suicide and transient populations such as people who had left prison in 
neighbouring cities and were rehoused in the Scarborough region. These features could 
mean that clients seen by Street Triage were from outside the Health Trust area. The SWR 
locality also experienced high levels of alcohol and drug related mental health issues, 
including growing and problematic use of ‘legal highs’. Scarborough was the 83rd most 
deprived area in the UK in the 2010 Indices of Deprivation and has higher than average 
levels of unemployment. 
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Chapter 2 Method 
This chapter describes the method that was used to design and conduct the evaluation, 
explaining the ‘co-production’ approach and detailing the qualitative and quantitative 
strands of the project. 
2.1 Co-production 
A co-production approach was taken to both the design and conduct of the evaluation. The 
term ‘co-production’ originated in public service delivery and refers to an equal and 
reciprocal relationship between service providers and service users. It is difficult to achieve 
in practice and is uncommon in research, particularly evaluative research. However, it was 
used here as it mirrored the relationship between the police and NHS Mental Health Trust in 
the delivery of the SWR Street Triage pilot and because the evaluation was funded by an 
ESRC project examining co-production in research. Co-production in research is considered 
to be the equal involvement of non-academic partners in the research. 
This evaluation was initially requested at the inception of the SWR Street Triage pilot by the 
management of North Yorkshire Police (NYP) and TEWV, to address their need for robust 
information about the implementation and impact of the service. Although funding was not 
obtained until the pilot was nearing its completion, at the most fundamental level the 
research questions originated from the concerns of non-academic partners. 
These broad research aims were refined into a set of specific research questions through a 
number of stages of consultation both with service managers and operational staff. At the 
first meeting of the full project team (which included the university academics, 
management-level and senior operational staff of both services) participants were invited to 
put forward their key aspirations as to what the evaluation would accomplish. On-the-
ground operational staff contributed to the development of research questions through a 
focus group, which led to both a broadening and refining of the research questions. We 
used a ‘card sort’ approach, whereby each participant in the focus group was asked to write 
down three or four questions that they would like the evaluation to address. Each was 
written on a separate piece of card, and these cards were then organised into thematic 
groups (figure 2.1).  
Within the scope and resources of the study, not all of the questions and concerns put 
forward by the non-academic partners could be addressed. A key omission, recognised by all 
as important but beyond current resources, included gathering the direct perspective of 
service users themselves (i.e. patients)2. Similarly, it was not possible to include the 
                                                          
2
 The main obstacle here was the timescale of the project, which was carried out over only six months from the 
point of commission to the point of reporting. This was not felt to be enough time to adequately work through 
ethical requirements - both in terms of research governance processes and ‘in-practice’ ethics of ensuring 
well-managed and sensitive recruitment approaches. 
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perspectives of carers of service users. The desire of senior police personnel for a ‘return on 
investment’ analysis was also beyond the scope of the study, although some measures of 
service use were calculated to permit a rough assessment of cost/benefit. The question of 
whether the NYP/TEWV ‘model’ of street triage was the most effective way of delivering the 
service was also a question that could only be answered in a rather speculative sense, given 
the lack of specific comparators until the publication of evaluation findings from the other 
pilots. 
Figure 2.1 Card sort from first focus group 
 
A co-production approach was also taken to establish who to interview in the qualitative 
research. The two core groups previously identified were police personnel and the NHS 
team delivering the Street Triage service. However, it was on the suggestion of a police 
officer that we conduct focus group interviews with police personnel. This was hugely 
beneficial in that it significantly increased the numbers of operational police officers who 
were able to contribute. Additionally, several other services or organisations were 
suggested as relevant to interview given their interactions with, or interests in, Street 
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Triage. Project resources did not allow for all suggestions to be followed, but from the initial 
‘longlist’, a smaller number of interviews were prioritised as being of most relevance (see 
section 2.2).  
2.2 Qualitative research  
A total of 46 individuals participated in the qualitative research, as detailed in Table 2.1 
below. Police officers taking part included both Response and Safer Neighbourhoods 
personnel. 
Table 2.1 Qualitative research participants 
Police (n = 37) N = 46 
Inspector 5 
Sergeant 6 
Constable 10 
Police Community Support Officer (PCSO)  12 
Deployment manager  1 
Dispatcher 2 
Police Crime Commissioner 1 
  
Street Triage (n = 5)  
Band 6 Registered Mental Health Nurse 2 
Band 3 Community Support Worker 1 
Health Trust Manager 2 
  
Other services (n = 4)  
Ambulance service 1 
Emergency Duty Team Approved Mental Health Professional (AMHP) 1 
Third sector support organisation 1 
County Council Community Support Team 1 
 
Other key services which we had hoped to include within the qualitative research 
interviews, but project resources, timescales or participant availability did not allow were: 
 Clinical Commissioning Groups 
 A&E Department at Scarborough General Hospital 
 Vulnerable Adults Team at NYP 
 Mental Health Liaison team at Scarborough General Hospital 
Services which were suggested in initial discussion but did not make the shortlist of 
participants to pursue (within project resources) included: 
 Custody sergeants 
 British Transport Police  
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 Fire service 
 MedAx (police medical provider)  
 GPs and primary care 
 Social landlords 
 Housing Associations  
 Social Services 
Qualitative data collection included a combination of individual interviews, paired 
interviews and focus groups. Focus groups and paired interviews were conducted face to 
face. Individual interviews included some conducted face-to-face and others by telephone, 
according to participant availability and practicality. 
Interviews were audio recorded with participants’ permission and were transcribed by the 
researcher who had conducted the interviews. Focus group discussions were transcribed 
verbatim and individual/paired interviews were summarised in detail, including extensive 
verbatim extracts. 
Data were imported to the qualitative data management package MaxQDA2 and subjected 
to thematic analysis (Braun & Clark, 2006). Preliminary thematic categories were based on 
the study’s research questions, but the analytic approach also allowed for additional themes 
to emerge from the data. 
In the chapters that follow, several extracts from the interview transcripts are included. To 
preserve anonymity, quotes are attributed either to police officer, PCSO, triage team or 
multiagency respondent rather than to a more specific rank, role or organisation. 
2.3 Quantitative analysis 
There were three forms of quantitative analysis in this evaluation: 
2.3.1 Section 136 detentions 
Accurate recording of s.136 detentions is problematic with records being kept separately by 
police forces (of detentions in custody) and NHS Trusts (of detentions in health-based places 
of safety). In order to obtain reliable data, it is necessary to obtain both sets of records, 
cross-match and delete duplicates. 
To evaluate the extent to which the SWR Street Triage pilot impacted on the total number 
of s.136 detentions, we obtained records during the period of the 12 month Street Triage 
pilot (24 March 2014 to 23 March 2015) and, for comparison, the preceding 12 month 
period. We used records of detentions to custody (from NYP), detentions to the Health 
Based Place of Safety (HBPoS) (from TEWV) and detentions where there was a transfer from 
custody to the HBPoS (or vice versa) (from TEWV). We were unable to obtain data from 
A&E, so these figures could be an under-estimate of the use of s.136 in the SWR area. 
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Data were analysed using descriptive statistics. 
2.3.2 Street triage activity data 
This analysis is based on data collected by the Street Triage team and submitted to the 
Department of Health. Data were recorded by the Street Triage team on manual proformas 
and subsequently inputted into an electronic database, where it was cleansed by a data 
analyst. 
In the early months of the pilot (March-July 2014) this data set included a line of data 
entered for every individual ‘contact’ made by the Triage team – in other words every single 
activity they were involved in regarding a Street Triage client. It was later understood that 
the Department of Health only wished to receive information about the initial activity – 
known as a ‘referral’ – in the data returns. Hence the data set contains a mixture of 
activities (initial referrals and subsequent contacts) for the first months of the pilot but from 
the end of July onwards, only initial referrals were recorded. 
To reconcile this in the present analysis, repeat patient identifiers were examined alongside 
dates of recorded activities and (with reference to a separate data extraction provided by 
the TEWV analytical team) the closure dates of referrals. From this, a judgement was made 
on where to collapse activities with repeat clients into one ‘referral’. It should be 
acknowledged that while this exercise was done systematically, there was an element of 
estimation involved where specific information about referral closure dates could not be 
found. 
With the above manipulation of data, the final data set showed 524 distinct referrals to the 
Street Triage team, involving 379 different individuals (several people had two or more 
referrals to Triage). This data were analysed using descriptive statistics. 
2.3.3 Service user outcomes 
To explore the impact of contact with the SWR Street Triage on individuals who use the 
service, we conducted secondary analysis of data held in TEWV records. Data were 
extracted from the TEWV PARIS patient information system for 308 individuals who had a 
first contact with the SWR Street Triage team between 24th March and 24th December 2014. 
Demographic characteristics (age, gender and ethnicity), whether or not they were currently 
receiving care on the Care Programme Approach in TEWV and length of first contact with 
the SWR Street Triage team were extracted for each individual. Additionally, the following 
were extracted from PARIS for the six months before and after their first contact with the 
team to evaluate changes in service use after the Street Triage intervention: 
 Number of TEWV contacts 
 Total length of TEWV contacts (mins) 
 Number of episodes with crisis team 
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 Number of days with crisis team 
 Number of episodes with liaison team 
 Number of days with liaison team 
 Number of episodes with other community team 
 Number of days with other community team 
 Number of episodes with street triage (other team pre, SWR post) 
 Number of days with street triage (other team pre, SWR post) 
 Number of episodes with primary care mental health team 
 Number of days with primary care mental health team 
 Number of inpatient admissions 
 Number of inpatient days 
 Number of inpatient days on section 
Data were analysed using non-parametric descriptive statistics, as the variables were all 
positively skewed. To explore differences in TEWV service use before and after the first 
contact with the SWR Street Triage team, we conducted related-samples Wilcoxon signed 
rank tests for continuous variables and related-samples McNemar tests for categorical 
variables. All tests were at the 0.05 level of significance. 
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Chapter 3 Operating model 
This chapter considers in detail the Street Triage operating model in Scarborough Whitby 
Ryedale (SWR). Building on the summary overview of the operating model given in Chapter 
1, we discuss here in more depth the following elements of the model:  
 Staffing  
 Operating hours and availability 
 Base location  
 Deployment processes and transportation  
 Communication and information sharing  
 Eligibility criteria  
Each subsection describes: the model as initially implemented; any changes that were made 
during the pilot; and key strengths and challenges of the model. The chapter concludes with 
a brief discussion of how the size and geography of the locality influenced the operation of 
the service. 
3.1 Staffing 
3.1.1 Staffing levels 
The pilot funding allowed for 2.26 staff at Band 6 (Registered Mental Health Nurse) and 2.26 
staff at Band 3 (Community Support Worker). Once enhanced hours payments were taken 
into account, this amounted in effect to four full-time members of staff. Due to the 
enhanced level of security clearance required for the roles, there were delays in some staff 
taking up post. For the first few months, the pilot operated with two Band 6s but only one 
Band 3. A second Band 3 then took up post and the team operated at full staffing for around 
four or five months of the 12-month pilot, with some further staff turnover. However, the 
team subsequently lost one Band 3 worker and later one Band 6 nurse, who were not 
replaced due to the short-term nature of the pilot and uncertainty about future funding at 
that stage. 
The Triage team noted that even when operating with the initial staffing levels of two Band 
6s and two Band 3s, it had still been a challenge to provide a full, uninterrupted service, 
given that there was no cover for staff illness, training or annual leave. A change in hours of 
operation made towards the end of the pilot (described further below) entailed an increase 
from 10-hour shifts to 12-hour shifts; this increase in hours combined with the loss of staff 
made providing a full service effectively impossible. Mirroring the positive impacts of Street 
Triage when available (discussed in Chapter 5), the perceived impacts of reduced service 
availability were that demand then reverted to the ambulance service, the A&E department, 
the Crisis Team and greater use of s.136. 
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There was a unanimous message from police that they would like to see more staff and 
hence more hours of availability of the Street Triage service, with a seven day service 
resumed. Optimal staffing levels, from the perspective of the Triage team, were to have two 
Band 6s and one Band 3 working on any given shift i.e. an increase of one Band 6 from the 
initial operating model. To cover the desired number of hours of operation (see below), this 
would mean up to three teams – totalling nine staff in all. 
The pilot funding level did not allow for a dedicated manager for the Street Triage team. 
Although the team felt an excellent job had been done by the manager who had taken on 
this role alongside existing responsibilities, capacity to focus on and develop the service was 
inevitably limited. It was felt that a dedicated manager would have been beneficial, 
particularly given that this was a new and high-profile team. Administrative support would 
also have been helpful, to carry out data inputting and to support liaison work with other 
services during standard working hours (i.e. 9am-5pm Monday to Friday). 
3.1.2 Skills and expertise 
The Triage team members had backgrounds in Crisis teams, in-patient wards and secure 
mental health units. Their qualifications and skills were felt to be well matched to the roles 
and the team members felt that their professional backgrounds prepared them 
appropriately. The team had not undertaken any specific training in relation to the Street 
Triage pilot, but had undertaken refresher Safeguarding training shortly before the pilot 
launched. This was felt to be particularly useful, given that a much broader range of social 
issues were involved in the types of scenario that Triage attended, in comparison to 
standard Crisis team work. The assessments carried out in Triage situations were felt to be 
very similar to Crisis team assessments. However, one member of the team noted that in 
the Street Triage context, clients could be more in the midst of crisis than might be the case 
in Crisis team work, where issues had sometimes calmed down somewhat by the time of the 
assessment. As such, skills of engagement were all the more essential in the Triage role. 
There was also more liaison and follow-up work involved in Street Triage, in comparison to 
the more discrete shift work involved in a Crisis team role. 
Band 3 staff were not able to carry out clinical assessments and as such did not attend 
incidents unless accompanied by a Band 6 nurse. However, Band 3 staff were able to 
provide advice and background information by telephone or radio, carry out liaison work 
with the Crisis team, care coordinators and others, offer signposting and could also conduct 
follow-up appointments alone. As will be discussed further in Chapter 4, during the course 
of the pilot the role of the Band 3 staff expanded into work with Police Community Support 
Officers (PCSOs) around non-crisis, early intervention and multiagency work.  
Notwithstanding problems of availability, police officers felt that an excellent service was 
provided by the Triage team. An officer from North Yorkshire Police had sat on the interview 
panel, and this had been beneficial in ensuring that the individuals appointed also had 
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attributes and approaches which would work well in a policing context. 
Skills of engagement and rapport building were highlighted as important both by the Triage 
team and police officers who had observed the team in their work. Police officers admired 
the Triage team’s manner of interacting with individuals, highlighting the ‘softer’ way they 
spoke with them, their patience and their willingness to remain with an individual for as 
long as it took to be satisfied they were safe and that a suitable plan was in place. This was 
contrasted with the police’s feeling of being constantly pressured to conclude an incident 
and get on to the next job. The team’s positivity and enthusiasm for their work was also 
complimented, one officer highlighting that there was never any sense of reluctance about 
attending incidents. This was also reflected in the team’s readiness to work beyond the end 
of their shift if circumstances required. 
That the Triage team members were often already familiar with some clients was viewed as 
a further advantage, in terms of engagement, rapport and establishing background 
information. Where there was already knowledge of history and risk factors, this also meant 
that officers could be released sooner, Triage remaining with the client without police 
assistance. One member of the Triage team linked this familiarity with the client base to 
their having worked in the locality for very many years.  
In discussing possibilities for providing occasional staff cover to the Triage team, it was felt 
that members of the Crisis team would have the necessary skills to carry out assessments in 
the Street Triage context – although this could not be entirely ad hoc as the required levels 
of police clearance would need to be obtained in advance. 
3.2 Operating hours and availability 
The SWR Street Triage service initially operated from 3.00pm to 1.00am seven days a week. 
Based on an analysis of demand for the service carried out by the Triage team, these hours 
were changed in early January 2015 to operate from 10.30am to 10.30pm, again seven days 
a week.  
Among those consulted in the evaluation, there were mixed views about how beneficial this 
change in hours had been for police officers. Safer Neighbourhoods police and PCSOs 
tended to find the earlier shift pattern beneficial, reflecting their own shift pattern and 
times of peak demand. On the other hand, Response officers felt they had benefitted from 
the later shift pattern, given that they often encountered clients in mental distress during 
the night. A number of Response officers called for an extension of operating hours to 
provide cover into the early hours of the morning. 
The fifty per cent reduction in staffing (described above) led to challenges in providing 
desired levels of service. Initially, the team continued to work to a rota as if there was full 
staffing – but with certain shifts operated by either the Band 3 or the Band 6 working alone, 
and some shifts simply not staffed. Where the Band 3 covered shifts alone, it was not 
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possible to provide assessments in the community. One Safer Neighbourhoods officer noted 
that it was still beneficial during these times to have someone available to give advice by 
telephone or over the police radio. This was sometimes enough to enable Safer 
Neighbourhoods officers to make a decision about a situation they were encountering. In 
contrast, for some Response officers, this level of service was not thought to be very useful 
given that the types of scenario in which they would call on Street Triage would usually 
require an immediate at-the-scene response: 
Your heart sinks when you hear it, when they come on, on the radio and say, “Ah yeah, 
there’s only one of us, we aren’t coming out” (police officer) 
Covering a 12-hour shift alone was also not good for morale and could be lonely for 
members of the Triage team. 
The inconsistency in service staffing led to confusion for police officers, who could not be 
certain as to whether the service would be operating at any given time. There was a concern 
that this had led to officers using Triage less, either assuming the service was not available 
or not bothering to check, given the lack of consistency in operating hours: 
It’s just very, very unsatisfactory, running half a service. We did a lot of work in the beginning 
to raise our profile. We were going down to police briefings, introducing ourselves, and we 
did that for the first couple of months, so that police officers knew who we were and knew 
when we were on duty, and you know, we did a lot of work. And I just feel that we’re at risk 
of losing that, because it’s that “Are they working, aren’t they working?” You get to the point 
where people won’t bother cos they don’t know whether we’re there or not, so they’ll just do 
without us. And I think that’s a real kind of risk (Triage team) 
As such, a decision was taken in early April 20153 to move to a reduced but consistent set of 
operating hours, providing a service 10.30am-10.30pm on Thursdays, Fridays, Saturdays and 
Sundays, so that police could be sure of when the Triage service was available.  
The reduction in total hours of service was regrettable both for the police and the Triage 
team. However, the unsatisfactory and confusing nature of the intermittent service cover 
was evident in the comments of a number the police officers who took part in the research, 
and the move to reduced but more consistent hours of operation was recognised as 
bringing some advantages. For example, a PCSO noted that they would now know with 
certainty when they could schedule an appointment to visit a member of the community 
with the Triage team. The Triage team had the impression that referrals had indeed begun 
to increase now that the hours of service were more regular. 
There was a universal message from police that longer hours of operation, covering seven 
days a week, would be very welcome. Both the Triage team and police officers highlighted 
                                                          
3
 This was just after the end of the DH funding period, at the beginning of the three-month extension to 
funding provided by the Scarborough and Ryedale CCG. 
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the disappointment and frustration of Street Triage not being able to operate a seven day 
service or extended hours: 
You hear officers shout up when they’re at the incident, for Street Triage. And when you hear 
that they’re not on duty at the time, you can hear the disappointment in the officers, because 
they’re probably thinking to themselves, “Well, what we gonna do?”... I think you’ve got so 
used to them now – knowing that help’s there, there’s a professional there to help, to call up, 
and they will come straight out to you, they’ll be on the radio to you, straight away – that 
when they’re not there, it’s massively disappointing (PCSO) 
Although some officers commented that they would like to see Triage available around the 
clock, a 24-hour service was generally not felt to be essential by either police or the Triage 
team. However, extending the period of out of hours service was a common 
recommendation, and cover from 8am until around 2am or 3am was suggested as a 
beneficial period of operation. Although there was agreement that mental health crises 
tended to occur later in the day and into the night, it was also noted that mental health 
problems could affect people at any time of the day and demand for services could be 
unpredictable. 
3.3 Base location 
During the pilot, the SWR Triage team were based at an office at Cross Lane Hospital in 
Scarborough. A key advantage to being based in NHS premises was ready access to the 
PARIS patient information system. The Triage team routinely referred to this information 
prior to attending an incident, as well as in providing background for officers in remote 
advice-giving situations. For the Triage team, a fundamental requirement of any relocation 
of the operational base would be to ensure access to the PARIS system from that new 
location, so that patient background information could be readily retrieved. Being based 
alongside the local Crisis team and the s.136 Suite (Health-Based Place of Safety) at Cross 
Lane was also seen as an advantage in terms of ease of mutual information sharing where 
there was overlap in the client base. 
Maintaining a distinct identity, as separate from the police force, was seen as beneficial in 
terms of engagement with clients. Operating from a health service base rather than a police 
station (or other multiagency location) was seen by some as helpful in supporting this 
distinction:  
It supports our identity as health workers, being based at [NHS premises], that that’s what 
we are, we don’t work for the police, we don’t work for the local social services, we are 
health service staff, and I think it reinforces that (Triage team).  
At the same time, other participants did not see a separate base location as critical, so long 
as the distinction was clear to clients when working out in the community (e.g. through the 
Triage team being dressed in civilian clothing). A number of suggestions were made during 
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research interviews about possible alternative operating bases, including police stations, the 
Force Control Room, and the multiagency ‘hub’ which was located at Scarborough Town 
Hall. Pros and cons were noted for each of these potential options, discussed further in 
Chapter 9. 
3.4 Deployment processes and transportation 
Street Triage in SWR could only be requested by a police officer. Initially, the pilot had been 
designed such that only Force Control Room staff (namely Dispatchers) could request Street 
Triage. Police officers in the community would need to radio into Force Control to request a 
call to the Triage team. Over time, however, the routes in to Street Triage expanded such 
that Response and Safer Neighbourhoods officers of all ranks and also PCSOs could contact 
Street Triage directly. For Response incidents, deployment still was typically made via Force 
Control through the police radio, with Dispatch staff maintaining the Storm record during 
live incidents. For other types of concern, Safer Neighbourhoods officers and PCSOs could 
contact the Triage team directly to discuss and arrange planned visits in relation to non-
crisis situations where there were ongoing concerns about an individual in the community.  
Given that the Triage team had access to the police airwave and could be continually 
listening in, there were also occasions where they would hear a familiar name, hear the 
nature of the incident that was in progress, and offer to attend even before a request had 
been made by a police officer. Police officers appreciated this proactivity. 
Where an outside agency wished to refer someone to Street Triage this would be done via 
police officers, either through Force Control, the Safer Neighbourhoods teams or via officers 
who were also present at the time a member of the community was encountered.  
However, some participants suggested that a useful expansion to the Triage service would 
be for other agencies to be able to make direct referrals to Street Triage. This is discussed 
further in Chapter 9.  
To travel to incidents, the Triage team used an unmarked car equipped with the police radio 
and speaker system. However, they were not able to use the ‘blues and twos’ warning light 
system that might enable quicker attendance at a scene. It was noted that in some other 
Street Triage pilots across the country, mental health nurses and police officers were paired 
for the duration of a shift and could travel together in a police vehicle that allowed for this 
level of ‘bluelight’ emergency response. Although this could have significantly reduced 
travel times between locations, it was felt that in the SWR region levels of demand did not 
justify the assignment of an officer for a complete shift in this way: 
It’s a sparse population, it’s a small population, small resources. So yeah, we have to kind of 
do the best we can, really (Triage team). 
Where staffing levels allowed, Triage typically attended as a pair, one Band 6 nurse and one 
Band 3 support worker.  Although the Band 3 staff could not conduct formal assessments 
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themselves, there was felt to be benefit in having two members of staff attend: 
It’s good to have two sets of eyes [because] sometimes one person will see something the 
other doesn’t. Then you have a conversation afterwards about [it], see where you go from 
there (Triage team).  
Triage attending as a pair also increased the possibility that police officers could be released 
from an incident sooner.  
On arrival at an incident, if police had not already entered the scene, it was sometimes felt 
useful for Triage to present themselves first as this could support better engagement with 
the client: 
Ideally [we] let them go in first, and then we don’t make things worse’ (police officer). 
In the large majority of cases, the Triage team would attend incidents alongside police 
officers. In a crisis response scenario, police officers would invariably be in attendance at the 
scene before the Triage team arrived, and would stay at the scene until Triage were happy 
for officers to leave (or until the situation had been moved on in some other way). Triage 
staff commented that they felt safe and well supported by police when carrying out 
assessments in the community, helped by the continual communication channel provided 
via the airwave radio. 
On a small number of occasions, the Triage team had attended incidents unaccompanied by 
any police officers. This was only in situations where the client was well known to the Triage 
team and the assessed level of risk was low from both the mental health service and the 
police perspective: 
It’s generally with people that they’ve had contact with quite a lot. The same names come up 
in Scarborough certainly ... and if they know and have some sort of rapport with that person, 
they’ll go on their own (police officer) 
We’ve had calls before where  a job comes on and you shout a cop “Officer can you go to 
that” and [Triage] will come on and say, “We spoke to them, we had a chat with them 
yesterday, and we made an appointment to go and see them later on, so don’t worry about 
that, we’ll go and speak to them and we’ll speak to them about whatever they’re reporting 
now, and if it needs an officer we’ll let you know”. And more often than not they’ll come back 
and say “Don’t worry, don’t worry about it”. So, they are very good like that. They’re worth 
their weight in gold (police officer) 
Although the Triage team thought that unaccompanied visits had only happened a handful 
of times – ‘probably in single figures’ – several police officers of various roles and ranks 
highlighted this aspect of the service during research interviews and seemed to be of the 
impression that it was rather more commonplace. Regardless of the true figure, this 
therefore suggests that police personnel perceived it as an especially valuable aspect of the 
service, which they would appreciate happening even more, where possible.   
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Whether Triage attended the incident entirely unaccompanied, or whether they remained 
at the scene after officers had left, Force Control would be informed of when Triage arrived 
and when they left a ‘live’ incident and would keep the airwave channel open for the 
duration of the visit.  
Safer Neighbourhoods officers sometimes made planned appointments for Triage to visit an 
individual in their home, and again where risk was low, Triage had occasionally attended 
alone. For follow-up visits Triage team members would more commonly attend 
unaccompanied by police officers.  
A couple of challenges were noted in the way that Street Triage were being deployed. One 
was that Street Triage were occasionally requested at an incident after a s.136 detention 
had already been made. At this point, there was no functional role for the Triage team 
because with s.136 in place the next step was necessarily a Mental Health Act assessment 
by a different set of practitioners. The solution to this was seen to lie in more education for 
police officers about the process and implications of s.136 detentions.  
Another challenge regarding deployment was when more than one incident required 
Triage’s input simultaneously. Occasions were cited where there might be three or four jobs 
‘stacking’ for the Triage team. Increased staffing would go some way to addressing this 
problem, though it was recognised that this might be difficult to justify from a resource 
perspective: 
There’s times when you get two or three shouts up from the police at the same time, and 
that would be useful, I think, if you’d got two Band 6s, so at that point you can both go off in 
different directions. But that might be expensive to have that around the whole time, when it 
would only be needed very occasionally (Triage team) 
In these situations, a kind of triaging exercise had to be carried out on the jobs themselves, 
to establish which was the greater priority for Triage to attend; comments from the Triage 
team suggested that there could be some tensions when these situations arose. One view 
was that it was fine for Force Control to take the lead in prioritising their deployment, 
though the Triage team might on occasion share relevant patient information to assist that 
decision. However, there had been instances where Force Control had taken the decision to 
prioritise a particular case for Triage’s attendance where the Triage team member felt that 
the other concurrent incident could have benefitted more from their attendance. In this 
respect, it was felt that the team might benefit from somewhat more autonomy in deciding 
where to deploy. Interestingly, some police officers commented that in such scenarios, they 
were happy to let the Triage team lead on decision-making about priorities. Whilst it should 
be noted that these occasions were rare, and that case-by-case consideration would always 
be necessary, these contrasting perspectives suggest that there could be benefit in 
establishing a more explicit decision-making protocol for when multiple incidents were 
called in. Increased staffing levels would also go some way to addressing this dilemma. 
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3.5 Communication and information sharing 
Three key aspects of the information and communication system used in the SWR pilot 
were: use of police radios, access to PARIS patient records; and use of police records 
systems. 
The Triage team were equipped with police radios and an airwave licence had been paid for 
from the pilot budget. The Triage team also had unique ‘collar number’ identifiers. Enabling 
use of the police radio system was highlighted as a particular strength of the SWR operating 
model for several reasons, including: the ease and speed of communication both at base 
and in transit; the ability for Street Triage to continually listen in to incidents as they arose 
and proactively provide information or offer to attend; and to support the personal safety of 
Triage staff when attending incidents. Learning how to use the radios had taken a little while 
at the start of the pilot with a few mishaps (‘stuff like pressing the accidental emergency 
button and things!’ (Triage team)), but police officers and the mental health staff 
themselves noted that over time the Triage team had developed confidence in using the 
equipment and a greater understanding of its functionality. The Triage team also had 
landline and mobile numbers, which police were able to use as alternative means of 
contact, for example if the airwave was particularly busy. 
Access to the PARIS patient records system was seen as invaluable. Before attending an 
incident, the Triage team always consulted PARIS records to gather history about a client, 
but they would also regularly provide background information over the airwave to police 
officers, enabling the officers to make an assessment of how to proceed with an incident, 
including (where relevant) establishing whether Triage were required at the scene or not. As 
noted above, access to PARIS was seen as essential and would need to be facilitated at any 
other location from which Street Triage was to operate.  
In discussing response times to attend incidents, officers noted that although clearly very 
important, the time spent at base gathering background information could delay Triage’s 
arrival:  
They will really research that person, which is good in one way in terms of the assessment, 
but also sometimes can be a negative if you’re sat with someone waiting, it’s a balance isn’t 
it (police officer).  
The research that they have to do, sometimes that can take them half an hour, 45 minutes to 
go through their research, so you’re waiting that long for them to do some research on their 
computers before they come, and that’s time for us, like 45 minutes, you could have however 
many jobs in that time that you can’t go to cos you’re stuck (PCSO) 
One suggestion to address this was that it might be possible to facilitate mobile access to 
PARIS via a Wi-Fi enabled laptop or tablet device which could be used by the Triage team en 
route to an incident. Subsequent to the research data collection period of this evaluation, 
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the Triage team had in fact been provided with wi-fi enabled laptops and could now access 
patient information whilst in transit. 
Two police data recording systems were relevant to Triage activity - ‘Storm’ for live incidents 
and ‘Niche’ for the long-term record of closed incidents. For live incidents being monitored 
by Force Control, the Storm log would be continually updated with information including 
the input of Street Triage. At the close of an incident, the Storm record would be transferred 
automatically into Niche. The Triage team also provided a summary at the end of each shift 
detailing all activities undertaken, which was inputted by police personnel into Niche 
records. Having these updates in Niche was seen as useful to the police in situations where 
the same individual was encountered on subsequent occasions: 
It’s all good intelligence for us. We’ll have an update at the end of the job when [Triage] 
resume back to Cross Lane ... so that’s the most recent intelligence we’ve got for the next 
time we deal with that person, which actually helps [officers] because when they get a 
missing people report, they’ve got concerns for poor mental health, it helps with them, 
certainly particularly with Street Triage, cos you’ve got a health professional who’s given an 
up to date [report] (police officer) 
Emerging from the research discussion, there was some indication that (i) not all officers 
were aware that reports from Triage were fed back into Niche and (ii) it would be more 
effective if incident details were brought more quickly and directly to the attention of police 
personnel. This would avoid the scenario, which had sometimes arisen, where officers were 
called to the same scene only a few hours later and put in a request for a second attendance 
by Triage, unaware that a full assessment had already been carried out and that plan was in 
place with no further action deemed necessary: 
If you knew they’ve got an appointment tomorrow at nine o’clock at the Ellis Centre [CMHT], 
it’s all fine and that’s the plan, you wouldn’t always need [to attend], or if you did need to 
attend, you could just go and say “You’ve got a plan, you’re being seen tomorrow” and then 
come away (Triage team) 
Given their rather different role and ways of accessing information, Safer Neighbourhoods 
officers and PCSOs noted that it would be useful if they could receive a direct update or 
alert when a member of the community had been attended by Street Triage. If an incident 
had been handled via Force Control, PCSOs were sometimes unaware that a client known to 
them had been seen by Street Triage or that a visit was planned. An email sent to the Safer 
Neighbourhoods inbox to let them know that Triage had had involvement with a client was 
suggested as a way of ensuring information was conveyed. PCSOs also felt that more 
detailed written updates on the nature of Triage’s engagement with clients and any next 
steps planned would also be useful. As one PCSO noted, this could enable them to provide 
more effective input, for example, in reassuring the client, reminding them of scheduled 
follow-up appointments, and deflecting unnecessary further calls to Triage: 
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When we’re dealing with people long term, if we actually knew that Triage were going out and 
what they’ve done, if we see that person the next day, we know exactly what’s been said to 
them and things like that, so we can maybe stop them from ringing up again or presenting 
themselves in exactly the same way. We can say “Well we know Triage did this with you last 
night, do you want us to ring this person or do you want us to do that”, or whatever. But we 
can try and sort of back them off a little bit if they’re like trying to present in exactly the same 
way as they did the night before (PCSO) 
It was felt that having direct access to the Niche records system would be beneficial for the 
Triage team. This would enable the team to input their own case reports and updates, which 
would improve the level of detail and accuracy of information recorded about mental health 
incidents, which as one participant described it could sometimes be ‘like Chinese Whispers, 
so we’ll say something and then they’ll document something slightly different’ (Triage team). 
It would also enable Triage to access police-related client background information directly. 
Research participants also talked about increasing opportunities for face-to-face 
information sharing between police and the Triage team, away from the live incident 
scenario. In the early stages of the pilot, the Triage team had attended routine police 
briefings at different local stations. It had not been possible to sustain these visits when 
Triage staff numbers dropped, but both police and mental health staff had found this useful 
and something they would like to resume if possible. Other suggestions were a fortnightly or 
monthly ‘drop in’ at police stations, regular meetings with PCSOs to share updates on clients 
who were engaged with services in the long term, and attendance at the multiagency 
meetings that were held weekly in Safer Neighbourhoods areas, again to provide 
information about known clients. These types of contact and information sharing were seen 
as contributing to greater opportunities for crisis prevention and early intervention work. As 
noted earlier, some participants saw advantages in Triage being based at a police station in 
that this would allow more opportunities for informal face-to-face communication, 
information sharing and education. A police operating base would also be one of the more 
simple ways of facilitating direct access to Niche for the Triage team. 
3.6 Eligibility criteria 
The Street Triage service in SWR was an ‘all ages’ service with no lower or upper cut off. This 
was noted as a distinct advantage, offering something unique among the range of mental 
health provision available in the region: 
One of the problems [is] the CPNs that work in the Crisis team refuse to have any 
involvement with juveniles. And it’s a huge problem for us, out of hours and at night. But 
Scarborough Street Triage do, and that makes all the difference (multiagency respondent)   
Furthermore, the Triage team had agreed from the outset to operate a ‘never say no’ 
philosophy, where any referral from the police would be considered. This aspect of the 
service was very much appreciated by police officers and other services and was contrasted 
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favourably with other parts of the mental health service which imposed exclusion criteria 
around such things as patient intoxication, locations where assessments would be 
conducted out of hours and, as noted, the age of the client: 
They come out every time, don’t they ... The only reason I’ve known them not go to you, 
wherever you are, is cos they’re somewhere else (police officer) 
Your never say no approach to this is just so refreshing. That has been just brilliant, and you 
stand that at odds with other people that we deal with who are like “Oh, we can’t do that 
because they’re children” or “We can’t do that because they’re drunk”. Having just that 
approach where you’ll take anybody, and speak to anybody is fantastic (police officer) 
One of the things we’d agreed at the beginning of our service, that we wouldn’t say no to 
anything. And we pretty much haven’t (Triage team) 
3.7 Size of the locality and impact on response times  
The SWR pilot operated over a geographical area of approximately 900 square miles4 with 
typical driving times of between 30 and 45 minutes between the main centres of 
population. The Triage team were based close to the largest population centre (Scarborough 
town centre) but regularly attended incidents in the more outlying areas. Hence policing 
teams in all areas could expect to wait at least 45 minutes to an hour for attendance by 
Street Triage if they were travelling from a job in a different part of the locality. The 
gathering of background information from PARIS systems at the Triage office base also 
added to the time taken to arrive at an incident.  
Police in some areas of the locality seemed to be more tolerant than others of long waiting 
times for service. Officers based in the more rural and remote areas of the patch were more 
accustomed to long waits for services to attend and so found 45 to 60 minutes a fairly 
acceptable timeframe. In contrast, officers based in the more urban centre seemed 
somewhat more frustrated by having to wait for Triage to attend. As will be discussed 
further in Chapter 5, response officers sometimes felt the need to use s.136 powers because 
the level of risk at an incident was so immediate that they could not wait for Triage to 
arrive. Officers in more outlying locations were also more inclined to remain with the Triage 
team until an incident was concluded, in part because they were mindful of the length of 
time it would take them to travel back if they were later recalled to the scene:  
If they’re out somewhere in the sticks and it’s a 45 minute drive, I think the officer’s rationale 
is, “Well if I come back to Whitby and then they kick off, I’m only going to have to drive 
[back]” ... But I think in Scarborough, certainly when you listen to them, they’re like “Oh, 
Street Triage have got them and we’re off”, and I think a lot more of that goes on (police 
officer) 
A member of the Triage team did note that where travel times were particularly long, 
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 Figure provided by North Yorkshire Police GIS Application Support (ICT) team 
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incidents had sometimes been resolved by the time they arrived at the scene. 
There was felt to be no more practical single base for the Triage team than the one they 
currently operated from in Scarborough. Cross Lane Hospital was not the most central 
location on the SWR patch (it was suggested that Eastfield police station was perhaps 
slightly better located in terms of access to other population centres) but Scarborough was 
arguably the area of highest demand for service. Acknowledging the challenges of the 
geographical area, Scarborough was generally recognised as a sensible location for the base 
of operations.  
Although levels of demand were typically higher in the town centre location, there was no 
evidence to suggest that officers were not using Triage purely because of geographical 
distance from the operating base.  It was noted that there needed to be equitable access to 
the service across the locality and that priority should not be given to the areas of highest 
demand on that basis alone:  
We can’t just say to them to sit in Scarborough, because these other people [elsewhere] need 
their help as well. I mean, the funding’s there for that area ... it shouldn’t become a postcode 
lottery should it. Just to say to them no, we keep them in the centre of Scarborough because 
that’s where the bulk of the customers are. I mean if somebody out in the sticks- they all pay 
council tax don’t they, at the end of the day ... So they’re still entitled to service aren’t they, 
certainly as far as the National Health Service is concerned (police officer) 
One possibility suggested for reducing travel times was to have multiple bases located in 
local police stations. However, this had associated staffing and resource implications and 
clearly could not be facilitated under current staffing levels.  
Another potential solution to lengthy response times, which was being investigated by 
North Yorkshire Police around the time of the research, was the possibility of using video 
streaming to deliver remote triage from a mental health nurse in the control room to 
officers at an incident. However, research participants raised both practical and ethical 
concerns about this. In rural areas, the technological capacity to deliver high quality web-
based video feed was questioned. More importantly, mental health nurses and police 
officers voiced concerns about the appropriateness of conducting mental health assessment 
with clients in distress over a video interface. There was substantial agreement that this 
kind of service needed to be delivered in a personal, face-to-face manner both for the 
engagement with the client and also because of the importance of observing and assessing 
their physical appearance and (where relevant) living environment. 
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4 Street Triage in Practice 
This chapter looks at the type of work the Street Triage team engaged in. Section 4.1 gives 
an overview of the kinds of scenario in which Street Triage were offering input, drawing on 
both qualitative and quantitative data. Section 4.2 looks in more detail at the kinds of input 
provided by the Triage team. Section 4.3 considers the ‘triaging’ function of Street Triage, 
describing the ways in which the team was directing individuals towards various different 
pathways, as relevant. Section 4.4 discusses perceptions of the extent and appropriateness 
of use of Street Triage. 
4.1 Types of scenario addressed by Street Triage 
The SWR Street Triage service operated a ‘no exclusions’ philosophy and this was reflected 
in the wide range of incidents they had attended over the pilot year. Users spanned a wide 
age range from adolescents to people in their late 80s. A spectrum of mental health 
conditions had been encountered including severe mental illnesses through to milder forms 
of mental distress triggered by personal and social circumstances. Several incidents involved 
alcohol use as a primary or contributory factor. 
Situations described in the qualitative interviews involved the following range of 
circumstances: 
 Suicide attempts or expressions of intent 
 Self-harm or expressions of intent 
 A range of mental health problems including:  
o Personality disorder 
o Attachment disorder 
o Dementia 
o Psychosis 
o Depression 
 Learning disabilities 
 Neighbour disputes 
 Domestic conflicts - including disputes between couples and conflicts between young 
people and their families 
 Intoxication/substance use - drugs, alcohol, legal highs 
 People ‘behaving oddly’ or showing signs of cognitive confusion 
 Missing persons 
 Welfare checks and concerns for safety 
Based on data provided by TEWV, Table 4.1 below gives an overview of the types of mental 
health problems triggering involvement of Street Triage. 
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Table 4.1 Mental health problems triggering Triage involvement 
 n % 
Harm to self 247 47 
Unusual behaviour/any other mental health problem5 209 40 
Intoxication 36 7 
Harm to others 21 4 
Other aggression 8 2 
Physical violence 1 0 
Not recorded 2 0 
Total 524 100 
 
As has been recognised in several pilots across the country, the term ‘street’ in Street Triage 
was something of a misnomer as a substantial proportion of the service’s work took place in 
private home settings. Quantitative data provided by TEWV indicated that over the pilot 
year, just 25 per cent of referrals were initiated with the client in a public place, with 75 
percent occurring in private settings. For the police, knowing that Triage were on their way 
to assist gave them more confidence to stay with an individual in their home or, if 
encountered in a public place, to bring the person back to their home (on a voluntary basis) 
rather than transport to a place of safety: 
That’s another huge culture change. We’d have never done that before the triage team, 
because we’ve instantly lost our 136 power when they go into the house, and taken away 
what was previously our one and only option. We’d have never taken someone home. Yet 
that’s probably the best place for them, most of the time (police officer)  
Notably, the SWR Triage team provided input both to immediate crisis situations but also to 
non-crisis situations where police officers had more longstanding concerns about a member 
of the community. This latter type of input was something that developed as the pilot 
progressed, forming an increasing part of the Band 3 community support worker role, and is 
discussed further below. 
4.2 Types of input provided by Street Triage 
The Street Triage team provided a number of forms of input, including: 
 Face-to-face client assessments in crisis scenarios 
 Remote advice and information provision  
 Liaison, referral, signposting and follow up 
 Non-crisis assessments and multiagency interventions 
                                                          
5
 Incidents recorded in the category ‘unusual behaviour/any other mental health issue’ included: dementia, 
psychosis, autism, paranoia, delusions, hallucinations, rough sleeping, domestic disturbances, depression, 
wandering, confusion, expressing unusual or concerning beliefs, hearing voices, mania, domestic disturbances, 
agitation. 
 32 
 
Based on quantitative data provided by TEWV, Table 4.2 below shows the distribution of the 
three main types of Triage engagement. Note that this data relates to the initial contact in 
any given referral. Where referrals involved one or more follow up contacts, these included 
a mixture of telephone and face to face. 
Type of triage engagement n % 
Face to face 328 63 
Nurse to police telephone advice 156 29 
Nurse to client telephone advice 40 8 
Total 524 100 
 
4.2.1 Face-to-face crisis assessments 
As indicated by Table 4.1, the majority of incidents involving Triage related to individuals in 
crisis such as engaging in or expressing intent to self-harm, or behaving in an unusual or 
concerning manner.  
Case example 
Triage attended an elderly male in a residential care home, who was open to the elderly 
mental health team. The individual had dementia and had attempted to strangle another 
resident and was being very aggressive towards staff. The staff had called the police, who 
had attended and then called for triage. 
 
Triage arrived at around 9.00pm, engaged with and assessed the individual and established 
that a Mental Health Act (MHA) assessment was required. Triage stayed with him, managing 
the situation, until around 3.00am. Meanwhile, a large fight had broken out elsewhere in 
the town and police officers were able to leave triage at the care home and attend that 
incident. 
 
Following the MHA assessment, the individual was admitted to the elderly ward at the 
mental health hospital. Had triage not been available, the police would have been at a loss 
what to do, as they could not use s.136 within the residential care home and the individual 
was unwilling to go to A&E:  
 
 The police wouldn’t have thought about calling the crisis team. They would have just 
 basically stood there and scratched their head at that point, I think. I really don’t 
think they  knew what else to do. And they officers did say, actually, “If you weren’t here, 
I don’t know  what we’d have done”. And it also freed them up cos there was a big fight 
that went off in town just shortly afterwards, so they shot off and left us with him 
(Triage team)  
 
One of the triage team who had attended then encountered the individual on the ward 
some time later and noted a significant improvement, which was rewarding to see. 
In the large majority of cases, Triage assessments did not lead to detentions or admissions 
under the Mental Health Act. It was far more common for incidents to be de-escalated at 
 33 
 
the scene and for a plan to be put in place for liaison, referral, signposting and/or follow up 
by the Triage team (discussed further below).  
Containment and de-escalation were particularly useful in situations involving alcohol or 
drugs, and where other crisis services may have refused to engage. Although the Triage 
team agreed that it was very difficult to assess an individual who was heavily intoxicated, 
they would nevertheless attend the individual and assess as best as possible rather than 
turn down the police’s request for assistance. 
There were infrequent occasions where the outcome of an intervention would be a request 
for a full assessment under the Mental Health Act, and in a small minority of cases the 
Triage team had advised that under the circumstances use of a s.136 detention was 
appropriate. Instances were also noted where an individual had subsequently been arrested 
for a criminal office such as breach of the peace, where they were under the influence of 
alcohol. 
4.2.2 Remote advice and information provision 
As well as attending incidents in person, the Triage team provided background information 
to police officers over the radio airwave or telephone. At the request of an officer or PCSO, 
Triage would run a name through their patient records system and provide officers at or en 
route to the scene with some background information which could give helpful context and 
guide officers in how to proceed with a situation: 
I’ve been in touch with them before, over the phone and they’ve given me quite a lot of 
history on one particular individual that I can think of off the top of my head, which was 
helpful in how we then moved forward with him (police officer) 
I’ve rung them quite a lot when they’ve been on duty and just asked them about somebody 
and somebody’s history to see sort of whether they’ve got any support or anything like that 
(PCSO) 
As will be discussed in Chapter 5, providing access to patient information was seen as a key 
benefit of Street Triage, overcoming the blockages that had previously been encountered 
between police and health services. Useful information provided by Triage might include, 
for example, whether the individual was currently open to mental health services, whether 
they were receiving treatment, whether they had substance misuse issues, whether there 
were relevant family members to liaise with and any alternative address or contact details 
to those held by the police. Two instances were also noted of the Triage providing 
background information about deceased individuals where unexplained deaths were being 
investigated.  
Remote communication of this type sometimes avoided the need for Triage to attend in 
person. Advice given to officers over the radio or telephone could sometimes provide 
sufficient context for the police to proceed without further assistance: 
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They wouldn’t necessarily have to come out. It’s just sometimes that extra bit of information 
that they’ve got can dictate which way you may sort of go with this person that you’re 
dealing with (police officer) 
A number of officers commented positively on how Street Triage would also proactively 
‘shout up’ over the police radio if they heard a name that was familiar to them or if they 
overheard an incident unfolding where they felt it might be useful for them to intervene. 
The Triage team noted that this was something that they had begun to do more as the pilot 
progressed, as they became more confident and accustomed to using the police radios: 
They’re always listening. If they pick up on the name being said, they will call up and say, 
“Street Triage. Can I come in, I actually know that person”. They’re not just waiting to be sent 
to stuff. They are sort of actively engaging in what’s going on (police officer) 
What I like with it is that if you say somebody over the air that you’re dealing with, if they 
know about them, they’ll check their own systems and give you some background 
information if they’ve dealt with them before. Sometimes that can be all that we need, a 
little bit of information that they have been under sort of mental health treatment before, or 
something like that. So it’s useful (police officer)  
Case example 
A PCSO encountered an individual in the community who was displaying signs of mental 
distress. The gentleman was not willing to engage with the officer but did give his name. The 
PCSO ‘shouted up’ the name over the police airwave. The Triage team proactively 
responded, explaining that they were familiar with the individual and had in fact seen him 
the previous day. They went on to explain that the individual’s pet had recently passed away 
and this had caused a decline in his mental health. This was information that the PCSO felt 
she would not have managed to gain from the individual, given his reluctance to engage. 
Triage attended the scene accompanied the gentleman home and arranged for a follow up 
visit to be made the next day to check on his wellbeing. The PCSO felt that, had Triage not 
been listening over the radio airwave, the individual would not have received this level of 
support: ‘We wouldn’t have got sort of that level of support if they hadn’t been on the radios 
... He didn’t really want to talk to me very much ... If I’d got his address, I could have taken 
him home, but more often than not, in that situation, if they don’t want to engage then 
there’s very little that we can do’. 
In some cases, the Triage team would speak to a client directly over the telephone providing 
a form of remote guidance and support. This tended to be in cases where the individual was 
known to services and had perhaps had recent contact with the team or had an 
appointment pending with community mental health services. In these cases, Triage were 
able to offer verbal support and reassurance to the individual, reminding them of the plan 
that was in place or prompting them to contact a known keyworker: 
If they’ve got an appointment with the care coordinator the following day and there’s not 
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any risk identified, then it might be “Do they need to be seen tonight? What’s the risk if they 
don’t? Well they’ve got the appointment; remind them they’ve got their appointment with 
the care coordinator”. And we’d let the care coordinator know that the person had had 
contact with the police. So it’s just that kind of information sharing (Triage team) 
It should be noted that full initial assessments of individuals in crisis were not conducted by 
telephone in the SWR pilot. Face-to-face engagement was viewed as very important to 
being able to make a well-informed assessment and the ability to observe the individual’s 
wider context was also noted as beneficial. 
4.2.3 Liaison, referral, signposting and follow up 
The short term outcome of a Street Triage intervention varied according to individual 
circumstances, but would always conclude with a plan in place for follow up or next steps. 
This included liaison with other services (including GPs, care coordinators in community 
mental health teams and social services teams), referral or signposting to statutory or non-
statutory services, and follow up appointments with the individual either face-to-face or by 
telephone. The service model was designed to include up to three follow ups per incident, 
but this was applied flexibly according to individual need: 
We do try and follow people up with a quick phone call, even if we’re not going to see them 
again, just from a “How are you feeling?” kind of thing, “Has it settled down? Is it just the 
same?” ... Sometimes when you take the heat out, once the crisis has abated, you can 
actually often get a different view of it. So we try and sort of do a phone call just to check 
that up (Triage team) 
The Triage team were able to refer into primary and secondary mental health services 
(including the IAPT service) and could liaise and arrange appointments for patients who 
were resident in other Health Trust areas. An example was given of an individual from Leeds 
who presented in Scarborough stating suicidal intent. The Triage team liaised with the Leeds 
and York Partnership NHS Foundation Trust and arranged for an assessment to take place as 
soon as the individual arrived at her local hospital, meaning that she was not unduly 
detained away from home.  
In addition to referrals into statutory services, the Triage team also collected and 
maintained information on a range of non-statutory services to which they could refer or 
signpost individuals as relevant: 
We’ve got as many of the leaflets as we can find, really, as we’ve been going, picking them 
up from here, there and everywhere, so that we’ve got them if they need them. And we send 
them out by post, or if we’ve got them in the car we give them by hand (Triage team) 
Examples of charitable and third sector organisations mentioned in research interviews 
included: 
 Hopes service for survivors of sexual abuse 
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 Relate 
 Scarborough, Whitby & Ryedale Mind 
 St Catherine’s Hospice bereavement support service 
 Befriending services 
 Horizons drug and alcohol service 
 Citizen’s Advice Bureau 
 Debt advice services 
Speaking about liaison around young people with mental health problems, a multiagency 
respondent noted that through the working partnership between the police and the Triage 
team, useful links could be made between different sectors such as Youth Justice, targeted 
youth work, education and Child and Adolescent Mental Health Services (CAMHS). 
Another respondent highlighted the effective work Triage had done around linking people 
into substance misuse services: 
I think that we have done remarkable work in terms of the alcohol and drugs problem in 
Scarborough, so we’ve referred them into the correct service, whereas before, historically, 
these people were becoming a problem for the police [and] emergency services (Triage 
team).  
Liaison took up a substantial amount of the Triage team’s time and more than had originally 
been anticipated. As such, the value of administrative support to carry out some of this 
work was noted, should it be possible to expand staffing. 
4.2.4 Non-crisis assessments and multiagency interventions 
Involvement in non-crisis situations and greater involvement in multiagency approaches was 
an aspect of Triage which evolved during the course of the pilot. These types of input were 
particularly valued by Safer Neighbourhoods officers and PCSOs, whose role involved 
longer-term engagement with community issues. Officers could arrange a ‘planned’ joint 
visit where the Triage team could be briefed in advance and have time to gather together 
information from other services as relevant: 
Rather than being on call straight away saying “We need some assistance”, when you’ve got 
an ongoing issue, get to the point where I need some assistance, make arrangements, meet, 
do a joint visit, and then they take over (PCSO) 
Case example 
An individual who was known to the police as a ‘frequent flyer’ and would go through 
periods of regularly presenting at the police station (sometimes several times a day) 
reporting various highly implausible crimes. This would be a drain on police resources. In 
between these periods, however, the individual was apparently functioning in the 
community. Arrangements were made for Triage to carry out a planned assessment of the 
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individual at his home. It was established that the gentleman had been very unwell for a 
number of years, experiencing psychosis and paranoid delusions.   
Given that the individual was apparently functioning in the community in between episodes, 
the triage team suspected he may never have come to the attention of mental health 
services. However, on encountering the individual, it was quickly clear to the team that he 
was very unwell: ‘Suddenly, once you’ve got mental health services in there, it’s suddenly 
“My God!” sort of thing, you know, it’s “The man’s really unwell!” And he would have never 
come, I don’t suppose, to the attention of mental health services, had Street Triage not been 
around’. 
There was a keenness to expand this side of the service, to offer a more preventive, early 
intervention function, which could respond to the concerns of community-based officers 
who might become aware of early signs of decline in an individual’s mental wellbeing. 
Street Triage had also been involved in multiagency professionals meetings convened by the 
Community Safety Partnership, where the needs of a particular individual were being 
discussed, and police-led meetings where Acceptable Behaviour Contracts were being 
drafted. Street Triage were able to bring information on individuals’ mental health 
backgrounds (including any recent intervention by Triage themselves) and offer an expert 
perspective on potential ways forward. This input was noted as extremely helpful by the 
other agencies involved, and again something which there was a keenness to see expanded. 
4.3 The triaging role of Street Triage 
It emerged from the qualitative research data that the Street Triage team were providing a 
true triaging function resulting in a wide variety of outcomes. Importantly, the triage role 
extended beyond simply establishing whether a scenario warranted the use of s.136 
detention or not. The various possible outcomes of the Triage assessment process noted in 
research interviews included establishment of:  
 severe mental health problems requiring urgent secondary mental health input (and 
in a small number cases appropriate use of a s.136 detention)  
 lower level mental illness requiring referral to primary or secondary mental health 
services  
 personal, social or emotional issues (e.g. bereavement, relationship breakdown) 
requiring referral or signposting to statutory or third sector support 
 mental health problems which were causing behaviours that might otherwise have 
been inappropriately dealt with as criminal cases  
 mental health problems but with capacity to understand actions and consequences 
hence a valid case to pursue criminal or civil proceedings  
 no presence of mental illness but diagnosis of physical illness underlying distressed 
or confused behaviour 
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 primary problems of intoxication or addiction which could then be addressed with 
referral and signposting 
 
Case example 
Police were called to attend a shoplifting incident. The accused female was evidently in 
some mental distress, speaking about various difficulties in her life and becoming very 
emotional. The fact that she had stolen a very low value item when she had plenty of money 
in her purse further alerted the police that there could be a mental health issue. 
The female was taken to the police station where she was seen by Street Triage. As a result 
of the assessment, the female was admitted to hospital. The individual had had problems in 
the community before, but these had been ‘misunderstood’ without police having the full 
picture on her mental health. The shop owner had been seeking prosecution for the 
individual, which the police officer involved felt may have been the outcome were it not for 
Triage’s intervention: ‘Rather than deal with her as a criminal, we dealt with her as an 
individual with mental health issues [but] if the Triage team weren’t there, that’s what 
would have happened. She would basically have been criminalised because of it’.  
 
Case example 
Police were called to a female who was staying at a caravan park. The individual’s partner 
had called the police because she was exhibiting concerning behaviour (repeating numbers, 
calling people by the wrong names). The individual was not violent but was evidently not in 
control of her actions. 
The police contacted Triage, who were able to do some preliminary background checks 
before attending, established that the individual was from another area of the country, 
contacted the relevant mental health team and learned that she had recently been 
admitted to (general) hospital in the past, with a urinary tract infection. An ambulance was 
called and the individual was taken to the hospital, where she was diagnosed as having a 
recurrence of severe urinary tract infection, which was the cause of the unusual behaviour. 
In the absence of access to a triage service, the police would have considered s.136 
immediately: ‘We'd have gone "Oh right, 136", into custody, she'd have been there for 24 
hours, and just for the- she had just a really bad urine infection’. An officer who had been 
present at this incident commented: 
 That shows that they’re giving value for money are Street Triage, because that lady 
didn’t need to be put into a cell. It’s the most horrific experience for somebody that’s 
never been there, and just because of a medical condition she could have been put 
there. But they actually got that information, and it doesn’t happen then ... They got 
the information about the lady’s previous health ... and because of that, the right place 
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with her was at the hospital A&E. And it’s quite a simple thing to deal with once they 
get the right medication in. 
An important role of Street Triage, especially in relation to reducing the use of s.136 
detentions was assessing the degree of risk where individuals were expressing suicidal 
intent. Not having professional mental health expertise, police officers described how they 
had always had to ‘err on the side of caution’ in such situations, treating all expressions of 
intent as genuine. With Triage on hand to make a professional assessment, there were 
several occasions where the risk of suicide was in fact deemed to be low, and after de-
escalation and other follow-up support had been put in place, the individual could be 
allowed to remain at home: 
Very often Street Triage don’t spend a long time with [people]. We’ll turn up, they’ll tell us 
what they wanna tell us, you know, “My life’s shit, this, this and this, I’m gonna kill myself”. 
We know they’re not. Street Triage will come out and speak to them very quickly and 
establish that they’d not going to. And then they’ll be gone sort of ten, fifteen minutes after 
we are. I mean they see the same people again and again and again and again. So certainly 
as a quick fix, they’ve been fabulous, have Street Triage, really, really useful (police officer) 
Police officers were extremely grateful where Street Triage had been able to bring 
appropriate support to an individual experiencing a mental health crisis and in some cases 
avoid criminalising someone who was very unwell. However, there were occasions where 
they were also appreciative of Triage assessing an individual as not having a mental illness, 
allowing the police to pursue a different approach with that person. This was particularly 
useful in the case of what police referred to as ‘frequent flyers’ – people who made 
repeated inappropriate use of the police service, through regular calls for unwarranted 
assistance, spurious reports of crime or insincere threats to self-harm. This was viewed by 
some officers as ‘attention seeking’ and linked to personality disorder or substance use, but 
where Triage could advise that the person had capacity to understand the consequences of 
their actions, the police could then take punitive action or at least not devote further 
resources to inappropriate calls for service: 
I’ve sat through an assessment with one of our most prolific callers of that nature, and they 
[Triage] basically told her that she’s been assessed that many times that they know that 
there’s nothing that they can do to help her further than what she’d already got, and that 
that was it, and that nobody was going to entertain it any more because they couldn’t do any 
more. And then they just told her to – because she was at the police station at that point – 
just told her to leave. And she did. And she’s fine! (PCSO)  
This type of input was also of benefit to the Community Safety Team, who had the dual role 
of protection of the individual but also the interests of the community. Triage had been able 
to provide a steer as to whether individuals needed to be dealt with primarily on the basis of 
mental illness, or whether there was a justification for pursuing antisocial behaviour 
measures: 
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There’s something about that for me, for then being able to act on the person’s best 
interests, so what support does that look like, if we were to give support, is it mental health 
or is it lower level? Is it something we can deal with as a team? But also there’s something 
about being able to protect the wider community. So actually, if that person has got 
capacity, then we can start to take appropriate action, and sometimes unfortunately that is 
enforcement action, to protect the wider community (multiagency respondent) 
The Triage team were also not averse to supporting such outcomes. It was important to 
their professional practice that where an individual had capacity, they were helped to take 
responsibility for their actions and the consequences: 
I would absolutely defend to my last breath somebody with command hallucinations that 
had committed a crime. But somebody with a personality disorder that’s been shoplifting, 
and they had the capacity, they knew the consequences, they absolutely should face the 
same consequence as anybody else. Cos if they don’t then they’re not able to learn by their 
mistakes, if they don’t face consequences. So I would equally fight with my last breath that 
they absolutely should face the consequences (Triage team) 
 
Case example 
A female who was well known to the police and frequently came into contact with officers 
had been accused of stealing a handbag. The case had been going on for a long time and 
when it reached court was dismissed as not in the public interest due to the individual’s 
mental health. The victim of the crime complained and so the police officer contacted Street 
Triage to establish whether there was any history of service use. The individual was known 
to have alcohol misuse issues and had been in contact with a local support organisation, but 
other than one occasion where the individual had contacted mental health services saying 
she wished to take her own life, the Triage team did not find any other record of mental 
health service involvement. Having Street Triage as a bridge between police and mental 
health services meant that this information could be shared much more readily than might 
otherwise have been the case: 
 Without being able to pick up the phone, speak to them [Triage] and saying, “Just out 
of curiosity, do you have any background on her?” we would have had to try and go 
down the lines of getting in contact via the NHS or whatever. They’d have just turned 
round and say “Ooh, data protection. Can’t do that”. 
The case went back to court and the individual was prosecuted for theft. The police officer 
noted: ‘We still don’t know exactly why the court just threw it out [initially], but it was 
wrongfully done and their information actually just overruled their decision essentially.  
The individual was nevertheless in need of support and the police officer arranged for a 
PCSO to make a follow up visit. During this visit, the individual again expressed intent to end 
her life. The PCSO was able to request Street Triage, who attended and assessed the 
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individual. On arrival, it took only around five minutes for Triage to establish that the 
individual was not a suicide risk. The PCSO was then able to leave the scene, while Triage 
remained with the individual for around two hours. As far as officers were aware, Triage had 
had no further involvement with the individual following this. 
Had Street Triage not been available, the PCSO would have had to remain at the incident 
and call for the assistance of a police officer in light of what the individual was saying about 
harming herself. It would not have been possible to use s.136 in the private home 
environment and so the officers’ options would have been limited to calling out an 
ambulance or the Crisis team, which ‘would have turned into an hours and hours and hours 
situation’.  
 
Case example 
A young female was well known to the police as one of the highest repeat callers, 
sometimes making up to 30 calls per month. She experienced extreme Obsessive 
Compulsive Disorder but also had antisocial behaviour issues. Without expert knowledge, 
police were not able to effectively address this situation: ‘We didn’t understand her [and] 
we didn’t get anywhere with her. She was literally playing with the organisation’. 
Following intervention by Street Triage, multiagency liaison between the police and the 
individual’s mental health worker had led to a better understanding of the individual’s 
presentation and allowed the police to pursue a line of harassment warnings with regard to 
the antisocial behaviour (ASB): ‘We understand now that her OCD is one part of her and ASB 
is another, so we can now address it with confidence and deal with the ASB side ... knowing 
that she has capacity’ (police officer) 
Since this intervention, calls to the police from the individual had significantly reduced, to 
only around six calls in the past four months. 
 
4.4 Extent and appropriateness of service use 
Despite the universally positive views on Street Triage expressed by police officers (see 
Chapter 5), there was a feeling among some respondents that the service was not being 
utilised enough. Incidents were still being recorded where mental health was a factor but 
Street Triage had not been requested, and in some cases these had led to a s.136 detention. 
Differential use among different officers was noted: 
I think there’s pockets of police officers that have an interest in mental health, or are 
frustrated cos they don’t know what to do with mental health patients, and that group of 
people are using Triage, and requesting it. I still think there is a large portion of people the 
police aren’t even thinking about Triage. They’re either arresting them and taking them to 
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custody, they’re walking away and hoping that it doesn’t reoccur, or taking them to A&E 
(Triage team) 
Around the time of the research evaluation the police force had implemented some new 
actions and directives aimed at increasing awareness and use of the Triage service, 
including: 
 daily alerts to Force Control staff via the ‘scratchpad’ electronic memo system, giving 
reminders of when Triage came on shift and emphasising the need to use the service 
whenever mental health was a factor 
 a detailed email circulated to Force Control outlining the role, remit and operating 
procedures of Street Triage and again encouraging regular use 
 an instruction to frontline officers to always contact Street Triage in any mental 
health incident before using a s.136 detention6 
 The introduction of mental health ‘Champions’ in the Force Control Room, whose 
role included monitoring the Storm log and prompting officers to utilise Street Triage 
whenever a mental health flag was raised. 
The importance of the Triage team establishing and maintaining a profile among police 
officers emerged as a theme in the research. In the early days of operation, the Triage team 
had occasionally attended the briefing sessions held daily at each police station. This was 
seen as useful in building relationships, establishing an identity, and also gaining information 
about clients who might come to the attention of Street Triage during a shift. However, it 
had not been possible to continue this activity as staffing numbers dropped. During the 
research interviews, it was noted that it would be beneficial if, resources permitting, 
attendance at briefings could be resumed.  
Approximately half way through the pilot year, the Triage team had also delivered a briefing 
session for one of the Safer Neighbourhoods teams, in which they explained their role, remit 
and the input they could offer. This session had had the key benefit of raising awareness 
among PCSOs that they could also call upon the service:  
A lot of the PCs knew what Street Triage were, and were using them. But not all the PCSOs 
were aware what Triage can offer, so the actually came out for an hour and actually 
explained what they do, what they can help with, and since then, I think there’s been a 
bigger take-up then, once you knew what they could do for you and that they would come 
out [to PCSOs] as well (police officer) 
It was suggested that more awareness raising sessions of this type could further enhance 
service use across the SWR region. There was some indication that officers had not initially 
been aware of the full range of inputs that Street Triage could offer and the varied 
circumstances in which they might provide assistance. To some extent, this knowledge had 
                                                          
6
 NB: This was implemented on April 9
th
 and was an internal instruction to attempt to reduce the risk of 
inappropriate detentions 
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developed organically as the service had bedded in and word had spread about specific 
instances in which it had been used. It was recognised among police officers that their use 
of Triage had both increased and been refined as they got to know the service better, 
including an increased awareness that the service could be called upon for background 
checks and information provision as well as attendance in person at incidents: 
As times gone on and we’ve got to know them and what they can do, we’ve sort of learned 
how to use them better as well. Cos maybe we’ve not known initially how best to use them, 
and I think it has got better ... I think it’s more confidence in using them, from my 
perspective. Knowing that they’re there, knowing that there is a point of contact. Whereas 
until you’ve used it, you don’t sort of get used to what’s there (police officer) 
Officers are getting more educated on asking for Street Triage as well, cos if they go there- I 
mean [dispatch] staff are at the end of a phone. When officers go and meet them face-to-
face, it could be different to what we’ve been told on the phone. And they are shouting up 
now, and saying “Can we have Street Triage” (police officer) 
Being physically co-located with officers at police stations or in the Force Control Room was 
suggested as another way of maintaining a profile among officers and hence increasing use 
of the service. The potential benefits of co-location are discussed further in Chapter 8. 
Regarding whether police officers were using the service appropriately, the Triage team’s 
perspective was that they would rather be overused than underused. If the police had any 
genuine concern that an individual was experiencing a mental health problem, the Triage 
would rather be called out and perhaps reach an assessment of no mental health problem, 
than not be called when they perhaps could have offered useful support:  
There’s obviously times when we go out there and there is no identifiable mental disorder. 
But from the police’s point of view, you know, they need that confirmation. So that’s as 
important and as valuable, I think, as if the person has a mental illness (Triage team) 
On the whole, the Triage team felt that officers were using the service appropriately and if 
anything they wanted to see usage increased.  
In line with their ‘no exclusions’ approach, the team had rarely turned down a request to 
attend an incident. A small number of exceptions were noted, mainly occurring in the early 
days of the pilot, where an individual’s circumstances suggested to the team that what they 
were experiencing was a ‘normal reactive expression of emotion’ in relation to an upsetting 
life event. There was felt to be a need to dispel perceptions of Street Triage as just 
‘somebody to talk to’ or a ‘shoulder to cry on’ as this was not the role of the service. 
Moreover, the Triage team had a duty to conduct a thorough mental health assessment 
whenever attending an incident and in the case of normal emotional responses, this could 
be disproportionate and ‘not fair’ on the individual.  
The other type of circumstance noted where Triage may decide not to attend was where an 
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individual known to services had only very recently been assessed under the Mental Health 
Act and it would not have been appropriate to put them immediately through another full 
assessment unless it was evidently required.  
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5 Impact of Street Triage on services and service users 
This chapter considers the impact of Street Triage on a range of services and individuals, 
drawing on perspectives shared in the qualitative interviews. Subsections discuss the 
impacts on: 
 Police 
 Health services 
 Other services 
 Multiagency working relationships 
 Clients and carers 
While the discussion has been organised into subsections, it should be noted that many of 
the positive impacts described below spanned multiple groups. For instance, an improved 
experience for service users was seen as a benefit to both the police and health services 
looking to support these individuals. To give another example, speedier and more accurate 
assessment of mental health problems through having a qualified health professional at the 
scene was a benefit to individual service users and other allied health services, saving time 
and resources. 
5.1 Street Triage: a highly valued service 
Before discussing the specific impacts on different groups, it is important to highlight that 
across all of the different organisations and services who contributed to the research, views 
on Street Triage were universally positive. Other than the disappointment of reduced hours 
due to loss of staff (see Chapter 3), it was striking that nobody had anything negative to say 
about the service that was being provided. Moreover, officers taking part in the research 
felt that these uniformly positive views would be echoed by their colleagues across the SWR 
region: 
I don’t think I’ve ever heard anything negative about them, in any way, shape or form (police 
officer) 
Everybody sings their praises ... From a police perspective I have never heard anything 
negative said about them. Everything is extremely positive (police officer) 
I don’t think anyone will have a bad word to say about it (police officer) 
[1] These people, I think, are pretty much universally being seen as a benefit to us. [2] I think 
you’ll struggle to find anyone with a different opinion within the local police (police officers) 
Generally as police, we always find fault with something, and I think this is one of the few 
things that nobody can find fault with, you know, it’s a brilliant service (police officer) 
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Street Triage was described as ‘fantastic’, as being a ‘genuine help’, ‘worth their weight in 
gold’, a ‘godsend’ and even as ‘a lifeline’ for officers. Several participants, from the police 
and from other services, emphasised that the service would be greatly missed if 
discontinued, talking emotively about the ‘huge loss’ that this would be: 
We really wouldn’t want to lose them. It’s one of the few things that has ever been 
introduced that has genuinely helped us (police officer) 
When there was rumours that they’re going, it was like a black cloud up at that police station 
... They’ve made it so positive for us, and if you were gonna keep a resource, it would 
definitely be the Street Triage, definitely (police officer) 
Please don’t let them take them away because, you know, I just think they’re fantastic (police 
officer) 
The dread of them taking it away from us altogether is the main thing (police officer) 
I do think it will be an absolute disaster if Street Triage were to be pulled (multiagency 
respondent) 
They’ve filled so well that huge – it wasn’t a gap; it was a chasm [in mental health services]. 
They’ve filled that hole so well and without them, we’ll be poorer (multiagency respondent) 
It’s a positive thing and it will be a great shame if it’s lost (police officer) 
In summary, the Street Triage service was extremely highly valued by police officers across 
the SWR region, and its benefits were also recognised by public and third sector agencies 
beyond the police force. 
5.2 Impacts on police 
Positive impacts from the police perspective fell into four main themes:  
 Saving time and resources 
 Improved decision making through expertise and information sharing  
 Moving situations forward through liaison and multiagency working 
 Knowledge and attitudes towards mental health 
Note that impact on use of s.136 detentions is discussed separately in Chapter 6. 
5.2.1 Saving time and resources 
Time savings for the police came about in several ways: releasing officers from an incident 
sooner; concluding incidents more quickly overall; avoiding the need for officers to attend 
an incident; and reducing police time spent on problematic recurrent callers.  
Where Triage attended a live incident, it was sometimes possible for police officers or PCSOs 
to leave the scene earlier than they might otherwise have done. Once it was established 
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that there was a low level of risk and no other requirement for a police presence, officers 
could resume to other duties, leaving the Triage team with the client. This was perceived as 
a significant advantage by officers of all roles and ranks and the Triage team were also 
comfortable working in this way: 
They come out, and nine times out of ten, they’ll just take over and do what they need to do, 
which releases us to go back. That’s one of the biggest benefits of their situation is the time it 
saves us, to go out and move onto the next job (police officer)  
It’s made our life so much easier ... We get all these jobs on and we just need to resource 
them. So it’s a lot less stressful for us because we have more officers available. The officers 
can go on and deal with other things, rather than sitting with someone for hours when 
they’ve not really got the qualification to do so (police officer) 
The police will stay and while ever there’s a risk there’s never been any hassle at all with the 
police, they’re more than happy to stay if we need them to. But quite often if it’s people that 
we know, or if it’s people where there’s no risk presentation, or the risk is low and they’ve got 
a carer around ... then we do release the police as soon as is appropriate, as soon as we can, 
to get back out on the beat (Triage team)  
It takes a considerable amount of demand and a considerable amount of pressure off our 
frontline resources (police officer) 
One officer described how they would sometimes bring an individual in to the police station 
(on a voluntary basis), to be met there by Street Triage. Triage would then take over, 
enabling the officer to attend to other duties within the station (e.g. catching up on 
paperwork) whilst the assessment continued elsewhere in the building. This had the 
advantage of making the most of the officer’s time whilst also remaining in close proximity 
should help be required: 
It frees us up in the sense that I can finish writing that statement, or whatever ... You’re 
within ten seconds if anything goes wrong, but you’re not having to physically be sat with 
them like you would be in someone’s house (police officer) 
The ability to release officers more quickly was seen as effective both in scenarios of 
‘genuine’ mental health problems but also in those cases where antisocial behaviour, 
substance use or personality issues were believed to underpin the call for police service. 
Without the professional expertise of the Triage team, police officers felt duty-bound to 
remain with an individual, even if they felt there was no genuine risk to their wellbeing, 
because they did not have the professional skills to make this judgement call. But with 
Triage’s assistance, police officers could be assured that an accurate assessment had been 
made: 
We have an awful lot of people who ring up with shall we say ‘pretend’ mental illness, or 
personality issues. When we get one of those, Street Triage are fabulous for interjecting and 
allowing us to leave, because previously we’ve been stuck with them for hours ... Street 
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Triage, they have the training to say “This is a personality issue, you’re feeling these 
symptoms because you’re drunk, stop drinking”, and then people can go ... Because we know 
they’re not going to harm themselves, we’ve met them hundreds of times in exactly the same 
situation; they’re not. We know that, they know that, everybody knows that. But we aren’t 
mentally health trained, so we can’t say “You’re not gonna. We’re off” (police officer) 
Even where officers remained at an incident to its conclusion, some felt that with Triage’s 
input, situations were concluded more quickly overall. In contrast to the alternative of 
taking a client to A&E, it was noted that as soon as Triage arrived at the scene, time was 
being spent productively. Avoiding the need to take clients to A&E brought further time 
saving benefits for police officers and clients who were not sitting waiting in the emergency 
department for what was typically described as four or five hours before being seen. This 
was in addition to any time spent awaiting an ambulance. An incident attended by Street 
Triage could be concluded in half this amount of time or less (the median length of contact 
with street triage was 70 minutes – see chapter 7): 
So many times now, these guys turn up, and have that rapport, quite often will already know 
the people, can turn up, speak to them, and 15-20 minutes of their time saves four hours of 
our time. Because they’re able to say “Well, you’re not gonna kill yourself” or “You’re not 
gonna take a load of pills. Let’s book you an appointment” ... And that kind of ability to save 
a huge amount of time and resources for us, and similarly for the service user as well, they’re 
not sat in a police van, a police cell, A&E, for that amount of time (police officer) 
I’ve sat with [a colleague] in A&E before, with somebody who we’ve had detained under 136 
and we’ve been in Accident and Emergency for hours on end, waiting to be seen, and then for 
them to say “Well actually, they’re ok to go”, which could have been done three hours prior 
to that, if we had Street Triage at that time, to sort of make that assessment on the street 
(police officer)  
We don’t have the professional expertise ... so always having to err on the side of caution, 
which means a trip to A&E and Crisis team, then sit there for four or five hours. And on a 
Friday evening, to have two officers sat in A&E when there’s so much public order stuff going 
on in the town, it’s almost criminal really (police officer) 
Officers noted that A&E was not the appropriate setting for a person in mental health crisis 
and individuals themselves often did not appreciate being there, meaning that continued 
police presence was required to ensure that people did not ‘get fed up and wander off’, 
then becoming a high risk missing person requiring further police resource to relocate them.  
As will be discussed in Chapter 6, perceived time savings further came about through the 
perceived reduced use of s.136 detentions. Describing the typical scenario when Street 
Triage was not available, one officer noted: 
[You’d] take them to custody and then have the issues with custody. You’ve taken someone 
in for 136, and custody aren’t equipped to deal with it but we’d spend hours and you’d have 
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to stay with that detained person and watch them in a cell, whilst something was sorted out, 
and it could take 5-6 hours (police officer) 
PCSOs mentioned that by having access to Street Triage, there were occasions where they 
did not need to call upon a police officer to join them at an incident, again reducing the use 
of resources: 
As PCSOs, we don’t use the 136, but if we’ve got somebody that we think is perhaps on the 
borderline we can’t assess them and we wouldn’t be able to act on that ourselves, and it 
would take time up of the police officers coming to do it. Calling Triage instead alleviates us 
from having to call an officer off other duties to come and do that assessment (PCSO) 
It’s support for us, because sometimes if we get Street Triage out cos we’re not quite sure 
how to deal with them, it frees up an officer from having to come. Cos obviously if we’re not 
sure whether it’s gonna be a s.136 or not, if we can get Triage out and they can deal with 
them it frees up an officer (PCSO) 
It’s very rare that I’ve used them, but when I have it’s been a positive thing cos I don’t have to 
involve the response cops then, unless obviously there’s an immediate necessity to. And it 
frees them up to do what they need to do and then Street Triage just come and take people 
off our hands (PCSO) 
As described in chapter 3, there were also a small number of occasions where Triage had 
been able to attend an incident unaccompanied, avoiding the need for any police resource 
to be deployed. This included response incidents and also planned appointments made 
through Safer Neighbourhoods officers. This type of unaccompanied visit would only take 
place where there was a low level of risk and typically where the individual was already 
known to services: 
We’ve had calls before where a job comes on and you shout a cop “Officer can you go to 
that” and they [Triage] will come on and say, “We spoke to them, we had a chat with them 
yesterday, and we made an appointment to go and see them later on, so don’t worry about 
that, we’ll go and speak to them about whatever they’re reporting now, and if it needs an 
officer we’ll let you know”. And more often than not they’ll come back and say “Don’t worry, 
don’t worry about it”. So, they are very good like that (police officer) 
In the longer term, officers also felt that recurrent calls from certain problematic members 
of the community had reduced following contact with the Triage team. This included people 
who regularly called the police under the influence of alcohol or drugs, or who had 
‘personality issues’ and who took up a substantial amount of police time. Because these 
individuals would now be assessed quickly by Triage as requiring no further intervention, 
their attention seeking behaviours (as it was perceived by those officers commenting) were 
no longer proving effective and so calls to the police had reduced: 
It’s really helpful when Street Triage will come and say, “Well no, they haven’t got a mental 
health problem”. Whereas these people we’ve probably been bringing in 136 ... now we sort 
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of have a little bit more sort of faith in being able to sort of say “Well, no, actually, you know, 
we’re not gonna deal with you in this way”. And they don’t like it, because they’re a bit 
miffed, the fact that they’re not getting this attention. But for some of them, it does mean 
that they stop calling us (police officer) 
More positively, signposting and referrals made by Triage meant that some of these 
individuals were now connected with and receiving support from the appropriate support 
services, rather than placing demands inappropriately on the police. There was also a view 
that hearing the assessment of no mental illness from a qualified mental health nurse 
perhaps held more validity for the individual, who was then more accepting of the outcome. 
5.2.2 Improved decision making through expertise and information sharing 
Improved decision making came about through the information and expertise that Street 
Triage were able to bring to situations. Police personnel were very conscious that they were 
not experts in mental health. Officers wanted to do the best they could for clients in 
distress, but it could be ‘draining’ and demoralising to feel that they were unable to help or 
that their intervention was making things worse. The professional knowledge and patient 
background information provided by the Triage team helped police to feel confident that 
accurate assessments of the situation were being made and that mental health incidents 
would be well handled: 
We’re not the experts basically. We’re Jack-of-all-trades and previously we’ve gone and put a 
plaster over it and done our best, whereas now we can call those guys out, if they’re on duty, 
to come and assist us and give us some actual expert assessment and advice (police officer) 
It’s getting help first and having somebody there with an understanding who can assess and 
assist right from the beginning ... As much as we want to give these people time, you know, 
we’re talking to them but we don’t know if we’re saying the right things (police officer) 
It makes the incident more easy to deal with. If you know that they’re en route, you just have 
to keep an eye on the person, talk to them, find out what’s going on, but then someone that 
actually knows what they’re talking about turns up to deal with it (police officer) 
When you compare to the decisions we were making about people with none of that 
information; We’d have access to only police information, and we’re making decisions to put 
people in police cells, when we don’t- we’re not medical experts. I mean, it’s got to be better 
(police officer) 
Triage assessments led to quicker and more accurate assessment of the presence, nature 
and extent of mental illness. Examples were given where Triage’s intervention had revealed 
that an underlying physical health problem (for example, a urinary tract infection) was the 
cause of unusual behaviour, and as such detaining somebody as a mental health risk would 
have been wholly inappropriate. There were also examples where behaviours that may 
otherwise have been treated by the police as criminal or nuisance were identified by Triage 
as being related to serious mental ill health (see case examples given in Chapter 4).  
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A third type of scenario was where the individual was assessed as not having a mental 
illness, but was in genuine distress due to personal circumstances. Here Triage could provide 
signposting or referral to appropriate non-mental health services. This was equally useful to 
police officers who felt they would not have had the knowledge to provide help in these 
circumstances.  
Police officers appreciated the way that having input from mental health professionals 
shared or removed the ‘burden’ of decision making around clients experiencing mental 
health issues. This sharing or transferring of decision making was linked to perceived 
reductions in the use of s.136. In the absence of a professional opinion, s.136 could be used 
as a ‘catch all’ or ‘back covering exercise’ because officers felt the need to err on the side of 
caution (see Chapter 6 for further discussion). If Triage had attended and provided an expert 
assessment of mental health risk, police officers felt more confident to leave a client in their 
home. This benefit was also noted by participants from the Triage team and other agencies:  
I think there’s an overriding fear, if we don’t [use s.136] and this person then goes and kills 
themselves, it’s going to be us, isn’t it. So the safest option is always to use 136, but not 
maybe the most appropriate, but it’s better than that person losing their life. So for me they 
[Street Triage] take the whole burden of that away from us (police officer) 
I think it’s nice for the police to be able to hand it over to somebody that knows what they’re 
doing, rather than doing the best that they can, and then not feeling very confident in 
dealing with people with mental illness’ (Triage team) 
You’re sharing that responsibility aren’t you. So you’re sharing the risk ... Thresholds change 
all the time, capacity changes all the time, and then what we’ve got is a situation where 
we’re holding it here where people are saying “I’m worried this person’s gonna die, I’m 
worried this person’s gonna do something”, and we sit holding that. Now if you were sharing 
that risk with the right people, including mental health, then surely that risk is managed 
better for everybody (multiagency respondent)  
The background patient information provided remotely by Street Triage, over radio 
airwaves or by telephone, was also useful to officers in instances where the Triage team did 
not necessarily need to attend. This information could provide context for officers and guide 
their decisions as to how to approach or move forward with a situation: 
‘With the information side of it, that they can give us, we act on a lot of information and it 
sometimes determines how we deal with something and the best way for us to deal with it 
for the individual (police officer). 
As well as providing information about local service users, police benefitted from Triage’s 
ability to access out-of-area patient information somewhat more easily than the police 
could themselves. 
As noted in chapter 4, the triaging function of Street Triage worked both to identify cases of 
‘genuine’ mental illness but also in some cases to determine that individuals had capacity to 
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understand and moderate their behaviours and so could be treated under criminal 
processes. This had led to situations where the police’s approach to an individual had been 
altered, Triage’s assessment giving officers the confidence to proceed along punitive lines: 
Some of the most challenging people in Scarborough, we’ve actually changed our plans 
completely on the grounds of the only [thing] we can do with this is prosecute them, either 
bring them in for wasting police time or call for an ASBO on them. And we’d never of had the 
confidence to do that beforehand. But if somebody professional says “They are just wasting 
your time”, the officers will quite happily do it. But they would never do it off their own back, 
ever (police officer) 
Triage’s assessment also provided reassurance and boosted officers’ confidence where their 
own instincts about how to approach a situation were confirmed: 
I think you kind of feel reassured, if you’ve got somebody from the health perspective 
confirming what you already think, and if you’ve got people from different angles coming in 
saying the same thing, it kind of helps you to get it right first time (PCSO) 
Sometimes we’ll have a sort of gut feeling about where we wanna go with it, and quite often 
we’re supported by Street Triage who put that into a plan and a rationale and basically take 
the problem away from us (police officer) 
Triage’s NHS affiliation meant that there was now easier access to information and liaison 
with other parts of the health service, overcoming longstanding challenges of information 
sharing between the police and health services: 
Information sharing from the medical services generally is poor. They’re really nervous 
around sharing medical information and that’s a real blockage. Even though they’ve got 
lawful reasons they can do it, it’s a real blockage for us ... So that’s really a massive plus isn’t 
it (police officer) 
Triage were seen as a ‘bridge’ or a ‘link’ to both primary and secondary mental health care 
and were able to ‘get the ball rolling’ more quickly, for example, in getting responses from 
out of hours GPs. Triage’s involvement had been helpful in opening up information sharing 
and thus facilitating better support for individuals well known to the police. Speaking about 
a particular regular client, one officer noted: 
We’re now getting more information being shared back ... There’s information being shared 
back to all partners about her condition. Where before it was often hard to get the 
information between Cross Lane, the hospital, the doctors, now it’s shared, because it’s 
coming from the right organisation at the right time (police officer) 
There had been instances where police were not aware that an individual with whom they 
had regular contact was also open to mental health services and, vice versa, where the 
mental health team was unaware that a patient was using police services inappropriately. 
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Through multiagency liaison, Triage was able to put agencies together to begin a dialogue 
around individuals who were accessing both services: 
Some people have already been under CMHT and the police weren’t aware that they’re 
under CMHT, so there’s been a number of successful outcomes just actually connecting the 
care coordinator with the police ... Before, the care coordinator didn’t know that they were 
using the police inappropriately, being a bit of a nuisance for the police really, and the police 
didn’t know they had a care coordinator, so just that simply connecting people together has 
been really positive (Triage team) 
A knock-on effect of this information sharing in the Triage context was that Force Control 
personnel and individual police officers were now sometimes contacting the Crisis team 
outside of Triage operating hours to request background client information. The Crisis team 
were willing to provide this information and this was seen as a very positive step forward in 
partnership working. Likewise, there was a perception that police were now more willing 
than in the past to share client information around risk with mental health service 
personnel. Better information sharing was recognised as being in everybody’s best interests, 
but it was also acknowledged that this was a significant cultural change for organisations 
which would take time to embed. 
5.2.3 Moving situations forward through liaison and multiagency working 
Police officers felt that Triage intervention led to situations being moved forward quickly 
and constructively, in a way that they had not been able to achieve as a sole organisation:  
We always were aware of the people in our community that had the mental health problems, 
but we didn’t know how to deal with it. We were never trained in it, and so you just 
constantly dealt with them as being a problem that, “Oh, I’ve got to go back again”, and you 
never advanced the situation, you never got to a point of progressing it to a stage where it 
would be resolved. And I think the bringing in of the Street Triage now has actually given us 
that tool to be able to move it forward, so that they’re not just a constant call on our service 
(police officer) 
Prior to Street Triage, things tended to be passed around in circles. Something would come in 
and then they’d discuss it, “Oh we’ll pass that to so-and-so, whoever it is”, and then even 
though it was maybe a mental health issue, it would end up with housing, and it would go all 
the way round the houses and then come back to us, and we felt like nothing had moved 
forward. Whereas this is hitting it head on, straight away ... Some things you’ve got to wait 
such a long time to get the processes in place, where this just happens (PCSO) 
This ability to progress situations was linked to Triage’s easier access to health services, 
through its NHS affiliation and through the team’s liaison, signposting and multiagency 
activity. In turn, this was also a further contributor to time savings for the police: 
If there is a shortfall in one of the other agencies, if they’re not sort of pulling their weight 
with this person’s mental health and the support that they’re supposed to be getting, and 
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Street Triage come and they say, “Well, you’re supposed to have this support” and they sort 
of say, “Well I’m not getting that,” they would then chase it up and know how best to chase 
it up. Whereas if we did, we’d probably just end up getting cross with [services], and not 
really understanding it (PCSO) 
Case example 
A PCSO had been dealing with an ongoing neighbour dispute where there was ‘clearly 
something wrong’ but the officer had been at a loss as to how to move the situation 
forward. The gentleman who was exhibiting problematic behaviour had recently lost his 
mother and was hearing voices and banging his furniture, causing difficulties for his 
neighbour.  
The officer arranged a joint visit with Street Triage who came out and did an assessment of 
the individual’s mental health. Following this, they looked further into the individual’s 
history and liaised with his GP. The ultimate outcome was Triage signposting the gentleman 
to befriending services as it was felt that his problematic behaviour was a result of 
loneliness. Since Triage’s intervention, the problems had so far ceased. The PCSO 
commented that had it not been for Street Triage, ‘I wouldn’t have known which path to go 
down, to be fair’. 
 
Case example 
A woman who had a history of serious mental illness combined with alcohol misuse and had 
been sectioned in the past was now living in the community and had been doing well for a 
period of time. However, a neighbour began to report frequent problems with the individual 
coming home very late at night, showing signs of deteriorating and concerning behaviour 
and hoarding items in communal areas of the property causing access difficulties. The 
individual was at risk of eviction by the housing association and was also exhibiting 
problematic behaviours in relation to her child, who was in social services foster care. This 
was causing concerns to the school, which was reporting that the mother had been ‘hanging 
round the daughter ... hanging round the peripheries, sending bizarre letters to her’. Several 
agencies had attempted to engage but the individual was refusing entry to the property.  
Following some informal and incidental communications between agencies about this 
individual’s deteriorating mental health, a multiagency professional meeting was convened, 
involving Street Triage, the police, the individual’s care coordinator, social services and the 
council’s community safety officer. Agencies shared what they knew of the individual and 
exchanged ideas about what would be the most appropriate way to deal with the situation. 
A plan was made that the police and Street Triage would attend the property together with 
the individual’s care coordinator and attempt to gain entry to the property, on a 
volunteered basis if possible, but using the power of a s.135 warrant if necessary. This was 
described as ‘a planned approach’ with the aim of causing the individual the ‘least distress 
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possible’. 
The result of the intervention was that the individual was admitted to hospital under the 
Mental Health Act, with access gained to the property using a s.135 warrant, and was 
currently spending time as an in-patient. A PCSO who had been part of this intervention felt 
that Street Triage’s input had expedited the arrangement of the warrant, due to the 
information they were able to share across agencies. 
Whilst distressing for the individual, it was felt that this outcome was in her best long-term 
interests: ‘My expectation would be that she’d be quite angry about it still at the moment. 
But she gets quite psychotic and was clearly relapsing, once all the evidence was together on 
the table it was very clear’ (Triage team). There was also the beneficial outcome that the 
problematic behaviours in relation to her child and the school had ceased as a result of the 
in-patient admission. 
 
Case example 
A PCSO was called to an incident at a care home, where a young male with learning 
disabilities and personality disorder was presenting challenging and concerning behaviour, 
including going missing from the home. The care home was struggling to address the 
situation. The PCSO requested Street Triage, who were already occupied on another 
incident at that time, but were able to attend the following day to carry out an assessment 
of the young man, accompanied by police officers. 
Following Triage’s assessment, a Deprivation of Liberty Safeguard (DoLS)7 was put in place. 
This order set a number of conditions and constraints on the individual’s freedom to leave 
the premises. It was felt that Triage’s assessment was more thorough than those conducted 
by DoLS assessors and so expedited the process of obtaining the order, which may have 
been more difficult for the care home to achieve otherwise. 
As noted earlier, forward progress typically involved linking clients into relevant mental 
health or other social support services, but alternatively could be about establishing 
capacity and responsibility and thus enabling police officers to pursue punitive lines where 
appropriate. 
5.2.4 Knowledge and attitudes towards mental health 
On the whole, police did not feel that their attitudes towards working with individuals with 
mental health problems had changed since the introduction of Street Triage, in that their 
                                                          
7
 The aim of the safeguards is to provide legal protection for those who lack capacity to consent to care or 
treatment but are not detained under the Mental Health Act 1983. Introduced by an amendment to the 
Mental Capacity Act 2005, DoLS aim to make sure that people in care homes, hospital or supported living 
arrangements are looked after in a way that does not inappropriately restrict their freedom. 
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approach had always been one of sensitivity and a desire to provide the best possible 
service. Rather than changing the way they personally responded to individuals in crisis, the 
introduction of Street Triage was seen as giving them ‘another resource’, ‘a different option’ 
or ‘an extra tool in your box’ when dealing with mental health incidents. 
However, some frontline officers commented that they had picked up new knowledge or 
skills about how to interact with a person experiencing a mental health crisis. This had 
largely been through observing the Triage team in the course of their work at incidents, 
hearing how they spoke to clients and noting the kinds of questions they asked:  
Just listening to what they discuss with the person, if you’re there, and how they interact 
with the person and what sort of information they try to get from the person as well ... where 
to go with the conversation. After being with somebody who has been trained in how to 
speak to somebody or how to try and get that information out of them, it’s been a lot easier 
to be able to communicate with somebody with mental health (PCSO) 
When you’re just with them and you hear how they speak to them, and you just pick it up, it’s 
like osmosis really (police officer) 
I’ve learned quite a bit about what they ask, and sort of what they’re trying to get at, which 
you can then just essentially use yourself ... Like when was the last time they’d seen their GP? 
How long have they been feeling like that? When was the last time they felt like that? And 
what changed? You know, just being sat in on assessments you pick up on little things that 
you then just end up asking them automatically (police officer) 
One officer felt that knowing more about what to ask and how to ask had improved their 
ability to engage with individuals and in turn have more success in encouraging people to 
come voluntarily to a place of safety where necessary. There were also officers who felt 
they gained knowledge about different diagnoses and conditions, for example the 
distinctions (or indeed overlaps) between mental illness, personality disorder and substance 
misuse. It was also noted that some police officers were now independently referring clients 
to local drug and alcohol support services on their own initiative, prompted by what they 
had observed from Street Triage.  
As will be discussed further in chapter 9, the provision of more formal training to the police 
by the Triage team, as well as more informal opportunities to share knowledge, were felt to 
be very useful potential developments. 
From the mental health service perspective, it was felt that the partnership working through 
Street Triage had contributed to broadening police understandings of mental illness and 
risk, and the beginnings of culture change around shared organisational responsibility for 
mental health, in line with the Crisis Care Concordat. Some of the longer-serving police 
officers who took part in the research commented on the shifting role of policing in 
contemporary times, noting the need for cultural change in operational policing as support 
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for vulnerable individuals began to take prominence over the more traditional crime fighting 
role. These issues are discussed further in chapter 8.  
5.3 Impacts on health services 
A key impact on health services was that, through providing an effective triaging role, the 
Street Triage service was diverting unnecessary demand away from other parts of the 
mental health care pathway. As one respondent put it, ‘what Triage does is, in very crude 
terms, sorts the wheat from the chaff’. This reduced pressure on other services, freeing 
them up to focus on their core client groups. It was acknowledged that quantitative 
evidence of demand reduction was inherently difficult to obtain. However, the perceptions 
of those working in and across the Triage team and Crisis services was that the Crisis team 
was receiving fewer requests to facilitate assessments at A&E or in custody, and that fewer 
inappropriate (i.e. sub-threshold) referrals were being received. This is borne out by the 
quantitative findings presented in chapter 7. Triage were picking up individuals who in the 
past were likely to have presented to the Crisis team (directly or via A&E) but who often did 
not meet Crisis service thresholds: 
I think ultimately, the people that Triage have seen haven’t needed to see Crisis team. 
They’ve needed to see Street Triage. And the sole purpose of why the Department of Health 
set it up, which was to prevent unnecessary detentions under a 136, as well as provide a 
community service that didn’t push people into a mental health service, that’s exactly what 
they’ve done (Triage team) 
Another member of the Triage team commented that the Crisis team were ‘aware that an 
awful lot of people that would have come to them previously now get filtered out at the 
Triage level, and for that they’re very grateful’.  
Similar impacts were perceived in terms of diverting inappropriate demand away from 
community mental health services, psychology services, primary mental health care and 
GPs. This perception was also supported by the quantitative data (chapter 7). The 
phenomenon of ‘scatter referrals’ was described, whereby a referral would be made to 
multiple services in respect of one individual, because the referring party was unsure which 
service was the appropriate one to target. Each service would then have a duty to conduct 
an assessment, often with the result that the individual was not eligible for provision by that 
agency. Furthermore, for services with longer target response times, immediate issues had 
often dissipated by the time an assessment was made and the presentation could by then 
be somewhat ‘nondescript’. The early, on-the-spot intervention of Street Triage was seen to 
have reduced the scattergun approach to referrals, reduced duplication, and enabled more 
rapid and timely direction to the most appropriate service, which in many cases would not 
be secondary mental health care: 
It’s prevented an awful lot of that delay, wait, expensive reworking, and what it’s done at 
source is nipped a lot of things in the bud, by going out to the street – or often people’s 
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homes more often than we imagined – to see people, deal with things at source, signpost 
them correctly or offer a short bit of follow up to see things through. And those people then, 
on the whole, have not come into secondary mental healthcare (Triage team) 
At the same time as diverting unnecessary or inappropriate referrals away from community 
mental health services, it was noted that Street Triage also offered assurance to these 
teams in providing an additional line of support for existing clients out of hours. The ability 
to respond in the community out of hours and to offer a quicker response was felt to ‘add a 
more immediate string to the Crisis bow’. 
Police officers and members of the Triage team felt that use of A&E had been substantially 
reduced during times when Street Triage was on duty. Calculations carried out by TEWV 
suggested that, based on the presenting issues, around 80 per cent of cases referred to 
Triage would otherwise have gone to A&E in the absence of the service. Reduced use of A&E 
had associated benefits for the ambulance service, in that there was less demand for 
transportation to hospital: 
Previously the police had nobody to turn to. If they were faced with a situation with a mental 
health patient, it was call for an ambulance or take them up to hospital themselves. Now 
they’ve got this Triage team to be able to go and deal with them wherever they are, I think it 
probably has reduced the number of A&E admissions (multiagency respondent) 
As well as diverting people away from A&E in the first place, it was felt that Triage had also 
reduced repeat attendances through the implementation of appropriate onward referrals 
and support. Furthermore, it was noted that some of the individuals who misused police 
services with spurious calls for assistance behaved the same way with other emergency 
services and, as such, Triage was also contributing to a reduction in inappropriate demand 
on the ambulance service. 
Echoing the comments of police officers, the Triage team also felt that mental health 
services had benefited from improved mutual sharing of information. 
Only one possible negative impact on health services was mentioned, in that under a 
Payment by Results funding model, a diversion of clients away from the Crisis team may 
have financial implications that could be of concern at a strategic level. For operational 
personnel, however, the reduction of service demand and associated pressures was 
perceived as a positive outcome.  
5.4 Impacts on other services 
Other services consulted in the course of the evaluation included the social services 
Emergency Duty Team (EDT), the Borough Council’s Community Safety Partnership and a 
local third sector organisation offering support to clients with a wide range of personal and 
social needs. For all of these services, a key benefit of Street Triage was the provision of a 
rapid response mental health assessment service, operating in the community. Mental 
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health was a factor for many of the individuals who came into contact with these services, 
but respondents from each of the services noted challenges in gaining access to or forming 
productive partnerships with mental health services. Street Triage was seen to have 
provided an important bridge into mental health services meaning that clients were now 
receiving timely assessment and relevant onward referrals or signposting: 
What’s been the benefit of Street Triage really for us is that we have been able to get 
immediate support. So whether that’s been in the person’s home, whether that’s been on the 
street, we’ve been able to call on that service to say, ok, what is the immediate risk for that 
person from themselves or for others, but also looking to see whether we can get them into 
the service long-term (multiagency respondent) 
For some of the services consulted, it was not unusual for their clients to be arrested due to 
challenging or antisocial behaviours. Although a mental health assessment could be 
requested in custody, it was felt that these assessments were not very accurate or 
comprehensive: 
If they get arrested and they go into the cells, you can then ask for a mental health 
assessment. But then somebody comes down and they do a very quick mental health 
assessment and they’ll say “This person is ok to go; they’ve got no mental health issues”. And 
we know that’s rubbish, because we work with them. We’re not mental health trained, I 
wouldn’t profess to have any idea about mental health training, but I’ve done the job long 
enough. We’ve done the job long enough to know that there’s some issue that’s concerning, 
that concerns us, and it’s mental health issues (multiagency respondent) 
Access to the Street Triage service meant that clients who might otherwise be at risk of 
custody detention were now receiving a more thorough assessment and appropriate 
diversion and onwards support.  
The timeliness of intervention was highlighted as particularly important by one respondent, 
who described the needs of their client group as ‘immediate’ and not something that could 
wait several weeks to be addressed. Specific crises may be over relatively quickly (and often 
not appropriate for Crisis team intervention), but through their liaison, referral and 
signposting activities, what Street Triage had brought was the potential for longer term 
improvement in the ‘root causes’ of individuals’ difficulties: 
Most of the client groups we work with are immediate. It’s not something that you can say to 
them, “Well come in again in three weeks’ time and you might get seen by mental health 
services”. Because in three weeks’ time, [the crisis] has gone. But the issue hasn’t gone [and] 
without the Street Triage, the root cause is never dealt with (multiagency respondent) 
One respondent particularly emphasised the value of Street Triage being an all age service 
able to meet the needs of adolescents with mental health issues or behavioural problems. 
Triage was seen as highly effective in intervening and de-escalating domestic situations that 
might otherwise lead to arrest or removal of the young person from their home: 
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We have very difficult teenagers who are open to CAMHS and it’s really often escalating 
behavioural problems, and Street Triage might be called. But what they offer is just really 
fantastic, because it’s about nipping it in the bud before it kicks off ... It’s been kicking off at 
home and it’s been nipped in the bud before it’s escalated to that point where they’ve 
needed arresting [or] where they’ve needed  admitting to hospital (multiagency respondent)  
Echoing the perceptions of some police officers, it was noted that certain young people who 
were described as ‘revolving door’ clients were now being encountered less often, following 
intervention from Street Triage: 
I can think of two or three that are well known in the community that are now well known by 
Street Triage and they’ve actually stopped them coming in. Whereas we might have had 
them in custody every Saturday for the last, you know, six weeks, it’s completely quieted 
down ... Certain kids that had been so dreadfully problematic, where we’re stuck with them 
in custody at weekends, have actually settled, and I think that’s largely due to the influence 
of Street Triage (multiagency respondent) 
Demand on the Emergency Duty Team was perceived to have reduced since the 
introduction of Street Triage, in that fewer Mental Health Act assessments were being 
requested following a s.136 detention. Where it did appear that a client might be heading 
towards a s.136 detention, it was also noted as helpful that the Triage team sometimes gave 
the EDT a certain amount of advance warning meaning that the EDT could make 
preparations and begin to gather necessary information. Furthermore, staff carrying out 
Mental Health Act assessments in the community felt safer when accompanied by police 
and the Triage team, particularly if working late at night:  
If we have a community assessment which is picked up through Street Triage, we’ve got 
protection there, by the police and Street Triage, cos they’re there. Because many a times, 
we’re left on our own in the middle of the night, in a situation that’s not safe. So it’s that 
liaison, working together (multiagency) 
Again reflecting the experience of police officers, there was felt to be a useful role not only 
in connecting individuals into mental health services but also, where appropriate, providing 
a professional assessment that an individual had capacity and understanding of their actions 
and so could be dealt with along different lines. This was important for the Community 
Safety Team, whose role spanned both the protection of the individual but also the safety 
and interests of the wider community: 
Because of the problems they’re causing in society, some of these people need antisocial 
behaviour orders or the new criminal behaviour orders, and sometimes we’re not able to do 
that because what is being said is that they’ve got mental health issues. Now that’s ok, but 
quite often they’ve got the capacity to understand what they’re doing is having an impact on 
the community. But to get that information can take a long, long time, and whilst that’s 
happening, the community is suffering from that. So there’s two ways for [Triage], there’s 
one about protecting the individual but there’s also one about being able to protect the 
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community quick time as well from these individuals that are causing issues (multiagency 
respondent) 
As with the police and other emergency services, it was felt that demands made on third 
sector organisations by certain individuals who persistently made inappropriate use of these 
services would have been reduced by the intervention of Street Triage. 
A further benefit was that ‘safeguarding alerts’ put in by the police to social services teams 
were perceived to have reduced, now that Triage was able to provide immediate assistance 
and onward referral at policing incidents. 
5.5 Impacts on multiagency working relationships 
The Street Triage pilot was felt to have had a very positive impact on working relationships 
between the police and mental health services. From the police perspective, the service had 
been so useful to officers that, as already noted, views were universally positive about the 
Triage team. For both services, there was a feeling of partnership and collaboration in 
working towards the shared goal of delivering a better service for clients. One police officer 
described Street Triage as ‘part of the team ...  part of our policing team’. Street Triage was a 
positive and constructive interface between two services for whom in the past interactions 
had more often been strained or blocking: 
Interfaces where the relationship could grow were slim and far between, usually based 
around the crisis itself. The development of Triage allowed us to not only make a more 
efficient way of dealing with crises in the community, but also to spend more time with the 
police and grow the relationships (Triage team) 
It’s increased my faith in the mental health service, because of how difficult it’s been to 
communicate with the other mental health services that we’ve got. So for me, working with 
them [Triage] has increased my confidence in them getting the right support, through getting 
them that quickly and getting mental  health assessment that quickly (PCSO) 
The pilot had started to break down barriers that had previously existed between the police 
and Crisis services. Evidence of this came in the increased amount of information sharing 
between the two services that was now taking place outside of Triage operating hours (as 
noted in section 5.2.2).  
The face-to-face model of working between police and mental health professionals was felt 
to have contributed to the pilot’s effectiveness in strengthening working relationships. This 
had helped to develop mutual trust and a greater respect for each other’s roles. There had 
been education and an increase in understanding in both directions. Mental health staff 
acknowledged that they had not previously realised how much mental health was involved 
in policing work. This realisation had contributed to the greater willingness to share 
information between services and understanding of the need to work in effective 
partnership: 
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I can tell you that the nursing workforce didn’t believe that the police were dealing with 
mental health problems as much as they were ... And I think what’s happened is, having that 
insight, by spending time with the police and really seeing what they really are dealing with, 
shifted a massive culture that you never anticipated (Triage team) 
All of this has helped us see the police in a different light, because we see the pressures 
(Triage team) 
Mental health staff had been impressed by police officers’ attitudes and approaches to 
working with individuals experiencing mental distress, commenting on officers’ effective 
communication skills and sensitivity in interactions. In focus group discussion, one Triage 
nurse readily contested officers’ claims that they lacked competence in dealing 
appropriately with mental health scenarios: ‘Our key tool is communication, and you’re all 
skilled communicators, you know, don’t decry your own skills that you’ve already got’ (Triage 
team)  
At the strategic level, very productive working relationships had developed between senior 
members of TEWV and NYP, leading to further opportunities for new collaborative projects 
around mental health in policing. 
Respondents from other agencies commented that the introduction of Street Triage seemed 
to have led to improvements in multiagency working. For example, in a crisis situation, the 
presence of Street Triage along with the police seemed to mobilise ambulance and out of 
hours GP services more quickly and lead to a more cooperative approach by all parties. For 
the Community Safety team, Street Triage brought a highly valuable perspective and set of 
connections when participating in multiagency planning meetings. As will be discussed in 
chapter 9, there was felt to be much scope to build and expand upon this positive start. 
While messages about Triage’s impact on working relationships were very positive, it was 
noted that there was still further to go in improving systems around information governance 
and information sharing. There was also felt to be potential to further enhance cross-agency 
education and understanding, for example, through co-location of operating bases. 
5.6 Impacts on clients and carers 
This evaluation was not able to gather the views of clients and carers directly. However, the 
view of the police officers, mental health professionals and other services consulted, was 
that the majority of service users and carers were pleased with the intervention and support 
provided by Street Triage and that the service was leading to better outcomes for those 
individuals.  
5.6.1 Quicker access to accurate mental health assessment  
One of the most commonly mentioned benefits of Street Triage was that individuals were 
now getting much quicker access to a professional assessment of mental health. There was 
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a perception that the mental health assessments carried out in A&E departments were of 
lower quality, being briefer, less comprehensive and carried out by non-mental health 
specialists. 
The benefits of quicker access to thorough mental health assessments were seen both for 
clients encountered in urgent need of crisis care but also for individuals in the community 
about whom Safer Neighbourhoods officers and PCSO had lower level but perhaps more 
longstanding concerns: 
It’s an immediate professional help for them, isn’t it. They’re not waiting hours on end, 
they’re not waiting for a couple of days. It’s at the point that they are in crisis that they are 
getting that support (police officer) 
It was a struggle before and you could be waiting weeks for social services to get anybody 
out to do some- any form of assessment. Now, you speak to Triage, and if it isn’t that day it’s 
the following day (police officer) 
It’s about seeing the right person at the right time, isn’t it. Otherwise everybody is there for 
much longer, and in the middle of it all, you’ve got someone really distressed (Triage team) 
The benefit of an accurate mental health assessment was that individuals were then dealt 
with in the most appropriate way, whether that be down a mental health service pathway, a 
broader social support route or – where appropriate – through  criminal proceedings. This 
engagement into appropriate support could in turn reduce the likelihood that individuals 
would re-present in crisis to health or other services on multiple occasions. Importantly, 
accurate assessment of mental health meant that individuals were less likely to be treated 
as having committed a criminal offence where a mental health problem underpinned the 
behaviour.  
Case example 
Police were contacted by a female who had concerns about her husband. The husband was 
hitting out at her and showing difficult behaviours both in the home and when out in public. 
Triage assessed the gentleman in his home environment, spoke with the wife as well as the 
husband to obtain both opinions on the situation and also liaised with the doctor. The 
behaviours were assessed as relating to mental health. The police officer who had attended 
this incident noted that, prior to Street Triage, the incident would simply have been dealt 
with as a domestic violence issue: ‘It was all sorted out within house, with doctor’s 
appointments, proper assessments, etc. That’s how it worked. It could have been domestic 
violence, because he was hitting out at her, but it was something to do with his mental 
state’. 
The speed of response of the Triage service was compared favourably to Crisis team 
intervention, which was perceived to be less rapid and less flexible in terms of when, where 
and under what conditions they would assess an individual.  
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One officer highlighted the benefit of bringing the service to the user, given that people 
experiencing mental health problems might find it very difficult to initiate help-seeking or 
self-referral: 
We’re bringing the help to them, aren’t we, rather than them having to seek it themselves. 
And people will accept the help if it’s there, because it’s easy. Whereas if they have to get up 
and do something themselves, it’s hard ... Even if it is just a phone call and it’s easy to you 
and I, someone who’s depressed or whatever, they find it difficult (police officer) 
Some participants were of the firm belief that there were occasions where a suicide had 
been prevented by Triage’s intervention.  
Triage’s police-led referral route and early point of intervention meant that the service was 
reaching some individuals who might otherwise not come into contact with mental health 
services at all, or who had previously been known to services but had disengaged. There was 
felt to be a cohort of individuals who might never present to services either due to lack of 
insight into their mental health problems or because they were reluctant to engage with 
services: 
There’s a client group out there that don’t engage. That will always present in crisis. They 
don’t engage with community mental health teams, they don’t attend appointments, they 
don’t take their medication. And I think that that’s a service kind of we provide to them. They 
will always present in crisis, you won’t ever engage them in services, and I think it’s 
important that our service is there, because they do need a service (Triage team) 
We tend to see people who mental health services maybe wouldn’t be aware of otherwise, 
because it’s people who are contacting the police because of paranoia or whatever, and they 
genuinely believe that the police can help them when actually it’s a mental health issue. So 
they wouldn’t access the GP or mental health services, cos they don’t believe that it is a 
mental health issue. So we do get to see people, quite new people, who aren’t known to 
services, obviously got chronic a mental health problem. So it’s good in that sense cos we can 
actually get them help. Whereas they probably wouldn’t ever come to mental health services 
otherwise (Triage team) 
5.6.2 Liaison, referral and signposting 
More accurate assessment of mental health led in turn to more appropriate onward referral 
and signposting. Clients were now getting support and onward steps that were far more 
relevant to their situation, rather than spending hours in custody or A&E only to have no 
constructive outcome or follow up care. The Street Triage service had the capacity to do a 
small amount of follow up work for each client, and this could include both additional 
contacts with the client (face-to-face or by telephone) and liaison work with relevant 
services such as GPs or care coordinators. 
The Triage team’s NHS affiliation, along with their multiagency liaison and information 
sharing capabilities, contributed to their effectiveness in securing positive outcomes for 
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clients. Triage was able to expedite referrals to GPs, community mental health teams, the 
Crisis team and also direct inpatient admissions. Importantly, however, Triage’s role 
extended beyond making referrals into mental health services and encompassed the 
facilitation of a far broader range of social supports. Examples included securing access 
temporary housing through liaison with the council, and referral or signposting to 
relationship counselling, bereavement, employment, sexual health, drug and alcohol or 
befriending services.  
5.6.3 A better experience for clients 
There were several ways in which the introduction of Street Triage was seen to have 
improved the experience of individuals in mental distress. These included: being seen in 
their own homes; the better engagement that could be achieved with non-uniformed 
personnel; and the reduction in use of s.136 detentions, custody and A&E. 
Seeing clients in their own homes 
Despite the name of the service, the Street Triage team mostly saw clients in their own 
homes and this was highlighted as a particular benefit of the service. Some participants 
drew a contrast here with the Crisis team, who were understood not to make home visits 
out of hours.  
The home environment was felt to be a much more comfortable setting for clients in mental 
distress. Police felt that being able to wait with a client inside their home was more 
reassuring for the individual and could help with trust and engagement. There were also 
benefits to the Triage team of being able to observe the individual’s living conditions during 
the assessment: 
You build up that trust, because they know that someone else is coming for them, and we’re 
not going to arrest them. Cos if we keep them in the van, they start panicking that they are 
going to get arrested. Whereas we take them home, they’re a bit more comfortable, more 
relaxed, they know they’re going to get the help that they need (police officer) 
To be able to be seen really quickly in your own home, I think that a lot of patients are quite 
grateful for that, because normally, out of hours, they would have to go to A&E. And often 
it’s just that we can get that done in the comfort of their own home really and it’s better to 
see them, I think, in that kind of environment as well (Triage team) 
As noted earlier, a multiagency respondent highlighted the effectiveness of Street Triage in 
de-escalating domestic situations, particularly those involving young people and their 
families, meaning that issues could be ‘nipped in the bud’ before reaching the point of 
custody detention or hospital attendance. 
A further advantage of seeing clients in their own homes related to the geographical scale of 
the SWR locality. The main A&E department serving this area was at Scarborough General 
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Hospital which could mean that individuals transported there from outlying areas of the 
region could be left ‘stranded’ at A&E in the early hours of the morning: 
When you’ve got people living out at boundary of York and top side of Whitby, and then they 
don’t need admitting to hospital, there’s no means of getting people home, there’s no pot of 
money to pay for transport home, there’s no ambulance transport out of hours that we can 
use. So then people are kind of stranded in Scarborough, having been brought here by the 
police ... and then the crisis team are left with somebody at, you know, eleven o’clock at 
night, two o’clock in the morning, many miles from home and no way of getting home, and 
that’s kind of been a real problem. Whereas if we take the service to them, it’s just much, 
much more appropriate (Triage team) 
Where people were discharged from A&E out of hours, this could mean waiting around at 
the hospital until daytime public transport services resumed, attempting to contact a 
relative who could collect them, or could in some cases, where an individual was particularly 
vulnerable, incurring a large taxi fare at the expense of the health service. 
Better engagement with non-uniformed personnel  
It was felt that individuals in mental distress were more willing to engage with a mental 
health professional in civilian clothing than with a uniformed police officer. Police officers 
felt that their presence sometimes exacerbated an individual’s distress and could raise 
levels of anxiety and aggression: 
It’s always better there’s someone in a non-uniform role, who’s speaking as someone else. 
Because people still see the uniform; they don’t like it, and they won’t open up as much to 
you. Some will, some won’t. But I think the majority would rather speak to a medical 
professional ... they will talk a little bit more to someone in civilian clothing (police officer)  
They see us in our uniform and panic. They see someone else who actually understand what 
they’re going through, casually dressed, calm, and can speak to them, and knows what 
they’re talking about, saves hours. Vastly reduces the violence (police officer) 
[People] see the cops as the enemy all the time, so they won’t engage with them, whereas 
with a health professional they will. So it just brings things to a peaceful resolution, so much 
earlier sometimes. Whereas if it was just left to the Old Bill it would drag on for probably, for 
another two or three hours (police officer) 
Related to this, it was felt to be useful that Street Triage were seen as completely separate 
from the police service. Instances were noted where Triage had succeeded in making 
telephone contact with a missing individual where police calls had been ignored. It was 
speculated that the individuals concerned recognised the police telephone number and 
were rejecting the calls, whereas the Triage team had been able to establish contact via 
their own telephone number – which was perhaps also known to the individual but viewed 
more positively. 
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The better engagement achieved by the Triage team led to better outcomes and next steps, 
because through this engagement more detailed information could be gleaned about the 
individual’s situation. Bringing people in mental distress into contact with health 
professionals was sees as ‘doing the right thing’ for the individual: 
You just feel that you’ve done the right thing for the person themselves, by putting them in 
contact with the professionals (police officer) 
You can only sort of sympathise with somebody so many times before you’re repeating 
yourself, and you’re thinking, “Well I’m gonna have to make a decision here, what do we 
do?”. If [Triage] are on their way and coming, then it’s a case of they then take over and do it 
properly. So it’s kind of, not a confidence booster, but it just means you’re going into it 
knowing that there’s gonna hopefully be the right outcome (police officer) 
 
Case example 
A female who was known to the Crisis team had taken an overdose. Police had been called 
to the individual's home but she was not willing to go with police to the hospital.  
Having access to patient records, including her previous contacts with Crisis, the Triage team 
was able to get a level of engagement with the individual and build some rapport. The 
individual then agreed to go to hospital. 
Later that night, the individual went into heart failure. Had she remained at home and not 
been in hospital at this point, she may have died from this. The Triage team's ability to 
engage the individual, through use of access to background information, was seen as critical 
in bringing her to the right place at the right time when urgent healthcare was needed. 
It was noted that awareness of the Street Triage service was beginning to get embedded 
among some clients in the community and the sense from research participants was that 
the service was positively perceived. Indeed, there had been a few occasions where service 
users had presented at police stations and directly requested to see Street Triage. This was 
not felt to be an appropriate route into the service, but did reflect the positive reputation 
that the service was developing among service users. Where individuals had had more than 
one contact with the Street Triage team, the continuity of personnel was perceived to be 
positive, in that clients were more comfortable to engage with a professional with whom 
they already had some existing history and rapport. 
As will be discussed in detail in Chapter 6, quicker access to professional mental health 
assessment was perceived to have reduced the use of s.136 custody detentions by police 
officers. This had the obvious benefits to clients of a less distressing and less threatening 
experience in the immediate term, but also avoided the longer term implications for the 
individual of having had a detention under the Mental Health Act, such as perceived 
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implications for employment, driving licenses, overseas travel and obtaining insurance or 
mortgages.  
Street Triage had also led to perceived less use of A&E either as a formal place of safety 
under s.136 or on a voluntary basis. The benefit of incidents being concluded more quickly 
overall, with far less time spent waiting at A&E departments was noted as equally of benefit 
to clients as to police personnel. Summing up the benefits to clients, a member of the Triage 
team commented: 
Traditionally the police would have either taken them to the cells and ordered a 136 
assessment, taken them to A&E and ordered a 136 assessment, or not really known what to 
do and taken them to A&E anyway. So for those service users’ experience and for their 
carers’ experience, they’re getting on the spot, not quite instant, but as instant as you can 
get in the real world, on the street or at home assessment, to decide what is the level of 
mental health need, how are we gonna meet it or help this person meet that need, and what 
is our next step, straight away. So it’s much quicker, much more person-centred, much more 
immediate (Triage team)  
A multiagency respondent highlighted the positive impact Street Triage had had in reducing 
custody detentions of young people who were known to mental health or social services. 
Triage’s intervention and de-escalation of domestic situations, along with appropriate follow 
up, had meant that young people who regularly presented were now being seen less often 
in custody and families were being helped to manage behavioural situations at home: 
We get certain kids that will present at the police station every day and there is this thing 
about kids shouldn’t be in custody and we should look for alternative. But where Street 
Triage go in – usually it’s [Triage] and a police officer – sometimes it’s kicking off in the 
house, it actually nips it in the bud then and there. We don’t get parents saying “I don’t want 
this kid back. I’m putting the child on the street”. So it’s really preventing them from coming 
into the police station. And this is where I’ve found Street Triage invaluable (multiagency 
respondent) 
5.6.4 A better experience for carers 
Intervention from Street Triage was seen as a more positive experience for the families and 
carers of individuals experiencing mental health problems, in contrast to where situations 
were handled by the police working alone. The perceived reduction in use of s.136 
detentions and associated reduction in use of custody or A&E departments contributed to 
experiences being less distressing. Where carers and family members were present during 
an assessment, their views would be taken in to account, and they would also be involved in 
any follow up as appropriate. 
A service user and carer consultation group was convened at intervals by TEWV and 
feedback on experiences of the Triage service was very positive. Contrasting these families’ 
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experiences with the period before Street Triage was in place, a member of the Triage team 
described feedback from the consultation group in this way: 
Before Triage was around, they would not know where their daughter or son was, because 
they’d have been arrested and taken to custody. So 24 hours on, they wouldn’t know where 
they were, they’d get a phone call at half four in the morning, saying “We’re just gonna 
release them from custody”. Whereas with Triage being on, they feel it’s a better approach, 
it’s a nurse, they’re getting the appropriate help, they feel supported, they felt it was 
collaborative, and they felt that they were getting help as opposed to it’s just task-orientated 
(Triage team) 
5.6.5 Short-term negative impacts 
Although impacts on clients were felt to be positive overall, it was noted that in the short 
term a small number clients were not happy about the immediate outcomes of their 
assessment. For example, there were instances where individuals (or their carers) had been 
hoping that more medication would be prescribed or had in fact wanted an admission to 
hospital, but the assessment was that this was not the appropriate action: 
Some patients just won’t be happy. They won’t be happy with the fact that actually what 
you’ve done is you’ve gone and they’ve wanted admission and you’ve said “No, you don’t 
need admission” or they’ve wanted more medication and you’ve said “No, you don’t need 
more medication, you’ve got what you’ve got” type of thing, and they won’t be happy with 
that judgement (Triage team) 
I think always in mental health, particularly mental health crisis work, not all clients are 
going to be satisfied because they don’t all get what they want and what they expect from 
the service. People that think they’ve got they’ve got a mental illness who are assessed not to 
have a mental illness. So you will always get some conflict with the client. And the carers, you 
know, “My son, my daughter, my husband must have a mental illness because he’s behaving 
this way”, and that’s not always the case. So there’s always going to be that kind of dilemma 
in mental health crisis (Triage team) 
The experience of a mental health assessment could be unpleasant for an individual in the 
midst of crisis and where a section was advised, this could be distressing for individuals and 
carers. However, decisions and actions were always taken with the patient’s long-term 
interests at heart, based on the mental health nurses’ professional assessment. An example 
was given of a female who regularly went missing from home, leaving four children 
unattended. From the police perspective, their primary role at these times was to ensure 
the wellbeing of the children and when the mother was taken into hospital on a section, the 
police could at least be sure that the children would be taken care of for this period of time: 
‘It’s awful for her being sectioned, but what it does is that period of time, we know the kids 
are safe’ (police officer). 
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It was noted that these situations were not unique to the Triage context, and that the 
challenge of making the best decision for the patient when this may not match with their 
own wishes or expectations was common to any branch of mental health services. 
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6 Impact on use of s.136 detentions 
6.1 Quantitative evidence  
6.1.1 Overall rates of s.136 detentions 
Table 6.1 shows the total number of s.136 detentions per month taking place in the 
Scarborough, Whitby, Ryedale area during the period of the 12 month Street Triage pilot (24 
March 2014 to 23 March 2015) and, for comparison, the preceding 12 month period. The 
table combines figures for:  
 detentions to custody  
 detentions to the Health Based Place of Safety (HBPoS) 
 detentions where there was a transfer from custody to the HBPoS (or vice versa) 
Table 6.1 Section 136 detentions in SWR region during Triage pilot and preceding year 
 M A M J J A S O N D J F M TOTAL 
2013-2014 1 5 5 5 7 6 4 5 3 5 4 7 6 63 
2014-2015 1 4 8 8 6 5 3 11 7 8 5 2 7 75 
Change 0 -1 +3 +3 -1 -1 -1 +6 +4 +3 +1 -5 +1 +12 
 
Figures show an overall increase in the use of s.136 detentions to custody and/or the HBPoS 
in the pilot year as compared to the preceding year. On this basis, the pilot did not meet one 
of its key objectives. However, one possible explanation for this may be the lack of recorded 
figures for s.136 detentions which were taken to A&E departments. This was a challenge 
described by NYP and TEWV personnel from the outset of the evaluation. Whilst police kept 
robust records of s.136 custody detentions and, following the opening of the HBPoS on 27 
January 2014 records of all detentions admitted to the s.136 suite were maintained by the 
Trust, it was believed that hospital staff did not routinely maintain records of patients seen 
in this context8. NYP and TEWV attempts to obtain figures on s.136 detentions from A&E 
(prior to and separate from the present evaluation) have proved unsuccessful.  
Following the opening of the HBPoS, there was a decrease in the use of police custody as a 
place of safety. Custody detentions from 24 March 2013 to 26 January 2014 numbered 48; 
from 27 January 2014 until the end of the pilot on 23 March 2015, custody detentions 
totalled 34 (of which 16 transferred from custody to the HBPoS). Although a somewhat 
crude calculation, this suggests an approximately 50% reduction per month in custody 
detentions (4.8 over the 10 months prior to the opening of the HBPoS; 2.4 per month over 
the 14 months following the opening of the HBPoS).  
                                                          
8
 It was recognised that in some cases, A&E staff may not in fact have been made aware by police officers that 
a patient was there under a s.136 detention. 
 72 
 
As such, the increase in s.136 detentions during the pilot year was predominantly 
concentrated in the HBPoS. Some of this was a diversion from use of custody and it is worth 
noting that there was also a comparable increase in the use of s.136 detentions in the 
neighbouring Harrogate area over the same period (see Table 6.2, below). Whilst Harrogate 
had a smaller number of s.136 detentions overall, the increase in use of s.136 over the two 
years was in fact somewhat larger. Harrogate also gained access to a HBPoS in early 2014. 
This suggests there may have been an overall trend to greater use of s.136 following the 
opening of HBPoS’s in each locality. 
Table 6.2 Place of Safety use: Scarborough and Harrogate 2013/14 & 2014/15 
 Custody Transfer HBPoS TOTAL 
Scarborough 13-14 52 1 10 63 
Scarborough 14-15 14 15 46 75 
       
Harrogate 13-14 32 0 1 33 
Harrogate 14-15 16 2 26 44 
 
However, it is possible that the apparent overall increase in s.136 figures in SWR also 
reflects a shift from use of A&E as a place of safety (figures for which are not available) to 
the use of the HBPoS at Cross Lane hospital. In other words, s.136 detentions which 
previously taken to A&E and went unrecorded were now appearing in the statistics as 
detentions were diverted away from A&E and to the HBPoS where more accurate records 
were kept. Thus the apparent increase in detentions may be an artefact of recording, rather 
than a true increase. 
6.1.2 S.136 detentions within and outside of Triage hours 
By combining data from s.136 custody records, HBPoS records, the master data set of Street 
Triage activity maintained by NYP, and staff duty rotas provided by the Triage team, it was 
possible to go some way towards understanding patterns in use of s.136 when Street Triage 
were and were not on duty. 
From these data sources, it could be determined that of the 75 s.136 detentions during the 
pilot year: 
 24 (32%) took place during hours when the Triage team was on duty and there was 
Band 6 staffing (i.e. an assessment could be conducted if requested) 
 25 (35%) took place outside of Triage service hours or at times where there was no 
Band 6 on duty (i.e. assessments could not be carried out) or there was no staff 
cover despite it being within timetabled service hours9 
                                                          
9
 See Chapter 3 for discussion of challenges in consistently staffing the service during timetabled hours of 
operation 
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 26 (35%) took place on a day where the Triage service was operational and staffed 
but available data did not include a time of detention hence it could not be 
established whether the Triage team would have been on duty at that particular 
time 
Excluding this third category leaves 49 detentions where it could be determined whether or 
not Street Triage could potentially have been involved. Of these 49 detentions, 49% took 
place during Triage operating hours and 51% took place outside of service hours or at times 
when the service was not staffed by a Band 6 nurse or was entirely unstaffed. Although 
there are a substantial number of s.136 detentions which we have been unable to assign to 
either of these two categories, these figures tentatively suggest that rates of s.136 
detention were fairly similar when the Triage team were and were not on duty.  
The data records provided by NYP and TEWV explicitly note Triage team involvement in 20 
of the 24 s.136 detentions (83%) which took place during Triage operating hours. This 
suggests that police officers were, in the main, involving the service in instances where they 
suspected a s.136 may be called for – in other words, it did not seem that s.136 detentions 
were regularly being made by police during staffed Triage operating hours without involving 
the Triage team (although descriptive notes in the data records included a small number of 
cases where a s.136 detention was used without first consulting Triage team even though 
there were already on scene). 
Although we have been able to offer above one possible explanation for the overall lack of 
reduction in use of s.136 (relating to a diversion of unrecorded s.136 detentions away from 
A&E following the opening of the HBPoS), the finding that rates of use of s.136 barely 
differed when Triage were and were not on duty adds support to the conclusion that the 
introduction of Street Triage in SWR had not met the aim of reducing the use of s.136. 
However, s.136 rates in SWR are low in comparison to larger urban areas and it is possible 
that it is difficult to decrease them further. It could be argued that uses of s.136 were 
appropriate and Street Triage was not able to avoid its use. These figures, though, stand in 
contrast to the qualitative perceptions that Street Triage had noticeably reduced officers’ 
use of s.136. 
6.2 Qualitative perspectives 
6.2.1 Reasons underpinning a perceived reduction in use of s.136 when Triage on duty 
Although not reflected in the available quantitative data, police officers’ perception was that 
they were using s.136 detentions less when Street Triage was available. A key reasons for 
this, as has been noted in Chapter 5, was the improved access to quick and accurate 
assessment of mental health alongside access to information on patients’ mental health 
history, meaning that s.136 did not need to be used as a ‘catch all’ or precautionary 
measure:  
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Before we had them, we were basically dealing with so many people with mental health 
problems, with little or no training whatsoever on how to deal with that, and basically we 
were just using our powers under 136. And because we’re not medical experts, we were kind 
of arresting everyone under 136 because we didn’t know whether they were gonna be a 
threat to themselves and we weren’t in a position to make that medical judgement, we 
would just simply go down the Section 136 route (police officer) 
If we’re not quite sure, there’s a possibility they’re going to harm themselves or somebody, 
they’re in a public place, yeah, let’s get them under 136, just to cover our behinds basically. 
Whereas now, with Street Triage, they come and they’ve got the knowledge and the training 
to be able to assess the situation, and “Yeah, actually it doesn’t fall within that remit, but this 
is what we can do. Leave it with us, we’ll take over, we’ll sort it”, then that’s great (police 
officer) 
Precautionary use of s.136 detentions was linked to officers’ concerns about the 
consequences both for the individual and for the police force should there be a negative 
outcome. Officers stressed that they did not want to risk the individual (or members of the 
public) coming to harm, but were also mindful of the implications for themselves and the 
wider reputation of the force should harm come to an individual who they had left alone at 
a scene. In essence, without the input of Street Triage, officers generally felt the need to err 
on the side of caution and detain an individual, even though s.136 detentions rarely led to 
hospital admissions under the Mental Health Act. Despite its resource implications, without 
the support of Street Triage s.136 was seen as ‘the safest option’: 
[If] we let them walk away and then they kill themselves, we’d have of answer to that, and 
rightly so. So the safest option was to always go down the 136 route. So lots and lots of 
people getting arrested for 136, but hardly anyone was ever getting sectioned from it, which 
said, quite clearly, that maybe our assessments were wrong. But having not had that 
training, how, you know, we’re kind of forced into this position where we’re damned if we do 
and damned if we don’t (police officer) 
A lot of the time it’s about covering your own back, isn’t it, and making sure the person’s safe 
... The last few times I’ve had people like that, Street Triage haven’t been on, so it’s been, 
“Will you voluntarily go with ambulance, because of what you’ve said? If you won’t then 
we’re gonna have to take you ourselves under 136”, that’s been the answer (police officer) 
A commonly noted scenario was where someone threatened self-harm or expressed suicidal 
intent. Without Street Triage, police officers did not have the expertise to assess the 
sincerity of these expressions and so felt they had to treat them as genuine and use powers 
of s.136. Where Triage was present, the mental health nurses used their professional 
expertise to assess the extent to which an individual had true intent to self-harm or take 
their life. In some cases Triage would determine that the individual was not a suicide risk 
and with appropriate de-escalation, liaison and referral the person could remain in their 
home environment once the assessment had been concluded: 
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If Triage is saying that they are fit to be taken home, we trust that judgement then ... and 
touch wood, the judgement has been right each time. And having them has stopped that 
136. 136, over 90 per cent of the time isn’t the right thing. We’ve done it because we have no 
other option, and our clientele, some of the people we deal with, I’ll do anything to stop you 
harming yourself, anything. But if Street Triage tell me they know them, they aren’t gonna 
harm themselves, it’s stopped them from going to custody again (police officer)  
It’s the experience of working with them, the confidence that the Triage team are actually 
capable of assessing these people and from what we’ve seen, most people don’t get 136’d 
any more. So we know we don’t need that power (police officer) 
Use of s.136 had also been avoided in scenarios where Triage was able to establish that a 
physical health problem underpinned unusual behaviours or cognitive confusion, and in 
cases where there was an assessment of no mental illness and police could validly pursue a 
criminal course of action.  
They help the people with genuine mental health problems, but the flip side of it as well is 
that they will quite happily say, “You have no mental health issues” and we’ve got some, 
certainly in Scarborough, that will play agencies off against each other and they are, in my 
view anyway, just attention seekers ... And it’s really helpful when Street Triage will come 
and say, “Well no, they haven’t got a mental health problem”. Whereas these people we’ve 
probably been bringing in 136, [as a] back covering exercise, now we sort of have a little bit 
more sort of faith in being able to sort of say “Well, no. Actually, we’re not gonna deal with 
you in this way” (police officer) 
As noted earlier, the consequences of this change of approach by police officers sometimes 
resulted in a reduction in demand on police time from prolific callers. Where these 
individuals were no longer receiving the response and attention they sought, inappropriate 
contacts to the police tailed off, which again contributed to less use of s.136:  
The figures might have gone down because some of the ones that were attention seeking 
were having to be brought in for 136 because they were saying that they were gonna be a 
risk to themselves. Despite knowing that that’s not necessarily the case, you can’t leave them 
(PCSO) 
Case example 
A young female repeatedly came to the attention of the police, sometimes several times a 
week, because a friend of hers regularly reported that the individual was planning to harm 
herself. Each time, numerous officers were deployed to try to locate the individual, and 
Triage had also been requested on multiple occasions. These incidents were perceived as 
deliberate attempts to gain attention, through being detained under s.136. 
On all occasions, the outcome of the Triage assessment was that there was no mental 
illness, the individual was fine, blamed her friend for raising the alarm, and ‘just wanted to 
go home’. After a time, because the Triage assessment on each occasion remained as 
finding no mental illness, the police began to arrest the individual. 
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Prior to the triage pilot, this individual was being detained under s.136 ‘almost every other 
week’, either in custody or in the s.136 suite. Triage's intervention prevented the use of 
s136 in that any suggestion of mental ill health could now be dismissed. This did however 
mean that the individual was now being arrested on criminal grounds.  
The knock-on benefits of a (perceived) reduction in use of s.136 detentions were multiple, 
including: 
 reduction in police time spent waiting with a detainee in custody or A&E 
departments, which could instead be spent attending to other policing duties 
 reduction in health and social services resources that would be required to 
conduct a Mental Health Act assessment 
 avoiding inappropriate and distressing use of detention (particularly in custody) 
for individuals in mental health crisis 
 avoiding the escalation of violence or aggression that sometimes resulted from a 
custody detention 
 avoiding the tensions, arguments, delays and to-ing and fro-ing that could result 
from A&E departments’ reluctance to be considered a Place of Safety 
 for individuals, avoiding the future implications of a s.136 detention relating to, 
for example, job applications, travel and insurances. 
When Triage were not on duty, police officers typically referred to their options in a mental 
health incident as being either a s.136 detention to custody or A&E (interestingly there was 
limited mention of the s.136 Suite at Cross Lane) or a voluntary attendance at the A&E 
department. There was no suggestion in the qualitative data that the partnership with 
Street Triage was having a knock-on effect on officers’ confidence to not use s.136 at times 
when the team were not on duty. This suggests that officers still felt a need to ‘cover their 
backs’ with precautionary use of s.136 in the absence of Street Triage.  
6.2.2 Situations where s.136 would still be used 
Officers noted certain scenarios where they would still feel it necessary to use s.136 
detentions even when Triage were on duty. This included where there was an immediate 
risk to the individual’s safety (or that of others around them) which needed to be contained 
quickly and could not be delayed until Triage’s arrival. Examples included where there was a 
weapon or violence involved, or an immediate threat to life. The challenges of geographical 
distance in the SWR region along with the reduced staffing capacity (described in chapter 3) 
contributed to there being occasions where use of s.136 was seen as unavoidable. Although 
officers were willing and accustomed to waiting up to an hour for service, there were times 
when Triage were already engaged in another incident and would not be able to attend for 
some time. There was also some indication that officers in a Response role might feel 
pressure to resume to other duties and so use s.136 as a means of progressing an incident 
more quickly: 
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If it’s kicking off and busy, we’re not gonna wait an hour and a half for [Triage] to get there, 
because we know we’ve got a colleague needing something else and we’re thinking, “We’ll 
just section them and...” (police officer)  
There were also occasions where Triage themselves agreed that use of s.136 was 
appropriate, given that there was an assessment of serious mental illness but engagement 
was proving impossible and the individual was not willing or able to come voluntarily to a 
place of safety. Use of s.136 in such scenarios was seen as a means of getting the individual 
the appropriate support. The result of more accurate and appropriate assessments of 
mental health was that, where they did happen, the ‘quality’ of s.136s was seen to have 
improved. In other words, it may not be possible to eliminate the use of s.136, but where it 
did happen, this was truly in the individual’s best interests. In support of this view, a 
multiagency respondent involved in conducting Mental Health Act assessments commented 
that where Triage had recommended the use of s.136 this was invariably an appropriate 
decision: 
What I can say is if Street Triage have been involved and they feel that this person needs a 
Mental Health Act assessment, it’s usually the Full Monty and it is genuinely necessary ...  it’s 
not a waste of time (multiagency respondent) 
6.2.3 Residual inappropriate use of s.136 
Beyond the situations where use of s.136 was felt to be necessary, there was a view from 
mental health practitioners and some police personnel that s.136 was still being used 
inappropriately on some occasions. In particular, this was where the Triage team was on 
duty and could have been consulted prior to this action being taken, but was not10. Even 
more frustratingly for the Triage team, there had been occasions where they were already 
at the scene but officers had nonetheless implemented a s.136 detention. A member of the 
team described one such incident: 
We were called out to the bridge because the person was on the railings. The police 
negotiator had been involved, and the minute the person came down from the bridge, they 
were detained on a 136. And we’re sat there, on the bridge. And that’s kind of a real 
frustration, because we know that person absolutely could have been dealt with, without the 
detention (Triage team) 
The Triage team also noted an occasion where resources could have been deployed more 
effectively. Whilst on route to an individual who was giving a low level of concern, a more 
serious crisis incident was called in. Triage offered to divert to this new incident but were 
told to continue to the first incident as this had been ‘on the log’ for longer. Meanwhile, a 
s.136 detention was used in the other scenario. The team felt this could have been avoided 
had their offer to reprioritise deployment been taken up. 
                                                          
10
 Although, as noted above, the data suggest that this scenario was relatively infrequent; the available data 
indicate that Triage were in some way involved in over 80% of s.136 detentions when on duty. 
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The implications of these inappropriate uses of s.136 included a need to raise and maintain 
the profile of the Triage team and also educate officers further on the role of the team and 
appropriate use of s.136 (discussed further in Chapter 9). Concerns were also raised by 
strategic level personnel that the use of custody as a place of safety remained unacceptably 
high.  
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7 Street triage usage and outcomes 
7.1 Street triage usage 
Data were collected for the Department of Health on usage of Street Triage from 24 March 
2014 to 24 March 2015 by the Street Triage team. As discussed in chapter 2, some people 
appeared more than once in this dataset so a distinction is made between service users 
(data about individuals) and referrals (data about incidents) in this section. 
7.1.1 Demographics 
The mean age of the 379 users of street triage was 43.5 years (range=13-91). 212 (56%) 
were male and 363 (96%) were white British (table 7.1). 
Table 7.1 Ethnicity of street triage users 
 n % 
White British 363 95.8 
White Irish 3 0.8 
White Other 4 1.1 
Asian 2 0.5 
Other 2 0.5 
Not stated 5 1.3 
Total 379 100 
 
7.1.2 Referral patterns 
A mean of 42.3 referrals per month were received between April 2014 and February 2015 
with a rising linear trend over this period (figure 7.1). Demand for the service was constant 
throughout the week, with no significant variation according to day of the week (figure 7.2). 
Almost all initial assessments (n=481, 92%) took less than three hours to complete. Of the 
328 face to face contacts, 78% (n=256) were seen within one hour of referral from the 
police. Following the model of triage and assessment, 82% (n=310) of people seen by street 
triage were open to the SWR Street Triage team for less than one week. However, 42% 
(n=159) were followed-up by the team because of their clinical needs. 
Most of the referrals (n=430, 82%) were of people known to mental health services but only 
214 (41%) referrals had an active care plan and 228 (43%) referrals were open to mental 
health services at the time of the Street Triage intervention. A small, though not 
insignificant, proportion were known to CAMHS (n=56, 11%). Only 8% (n=44) of referrals 
had previously been detained under s.136. 
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Figure 7.1  Referrals received by SWR Street Triage team by month 
 
Figure 7.2  Referrals received by SWR Street Triage team by day of the week 
 
7.2 Outcomes of street triage interventions 
7.2.1 Referral outcomes 
Data about the outcomes of the street triage interventions were not recorded for 40% 
(n=212) referrals. As the proforma was incomplete, the following findings need to be 
treated with caution. 
173 (33%) referrals were marked as ‘informal referral to mental health services’ and a 
further 123 (23%) as ‘community referral’. However, the notes column shows overlap in the 
use of these two codes. Other recorded outcomes were s.136 detentions (n=11, 2%) and 
arrests for breach of the peace (n=5, 1%). 
Analysis of the notes column showed that 57 (11%) referrals were intoxicated and no 
further action was taken by the SWR Street Triage team. A further 79 (15%) required no 
further action from the STR Street Triage team. 59 (11%) were marked as open to mental 
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health services and individuals were referred back to them. 36 (7%) referrals subsequently 
led to detentions under s.2 or s.3 of the Mental Health Act and 24 (5%) led to an informal 
psychiatric admission. Only 7 (1%) were recorded as declining a service. Other notes 
identified that information had been shared or the individual was referred to another 
community service.  
7.2.2 Impact on health service usage 
To explore the impact of street triage interventions on use of TEWV services, we extracted 
data from the PARIS database for a cohort of street triage users in its first nine months of 
operation. All those who were referred to the SWR street triage team between 24th March 
and 24th December 2014 were included in this analysis. Data were extracted for a period six 
months prior to their first contact with the team and six months afterwards to ascertain 
secular trends in their service usage. 
308 individuals were included in this analysis. Their mean age was 43.4 (s.d.=18.2), 54% 
(n=166) were male and 87% (n=267) were white British (this is likely to be an under-
estimate as ethnic coding was missing for 10% (n=30) of the sample). As these 
characteristics are very similar to the whole sample of SWR street triage users, it is 
reasonable to conclude that they form a representative sample. 
Only 11% (n=33) were on the Care Programme Approach, which contrasts sharply with the 
43% of referrals who were open to mental health services (see section 7.1.2), but this is 
likely to be a recording artifice. The SWR street triage team were in contact with these 
individuals for a median of 70 minutes (IQR=30-120). 
Service use data is presented in table 7.2 and are explored in more depth below. 
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Table 7.2 Analysis of TEWV service usage before and after first contact with SWR Street Triage team 
 6 months pre-street triage 6 months post-street triage  
 Total Range Median 
(IQR) 
At least 
one 
Total Range Median 
(IQR) 
At least 
one 
Statistical 
significance 
Number of TEWV contacts 3,399 0-184 1 (0-7) 166 
(53.9%) 
4,936 0-302 1 (1-13) 156 
(50.6%) 
p=0.004** 
Total length of TEWV contacts (mins) 131,624 0-10,230 25 (0-305)  166,127 0-10,727 2.5 (0-320)  p=0.286 
No of episodes with crisis team 160 0-7 0 (0-0) 76 
(24.7%) 
40 0-4 0 (0-0) 28 
(9.1%) 
p<0.001*** 
No of days with crisis team 1,188 0-182 0 (0-0)  299 0-51 0 (0-0)  p<0.001*** 
No of episodes with liaison 5 0-2 0 (0-0) 4 (1.3%) 2 0-1 0 (0-0) 2 (0.6%) p=0.180 
No of days with liaison 21 0-16 0 (0-0)  5 0-5 0 (0-0)  p=0.343 
No of episodes with other community 
team 
181 0-6 0 (0-1) 124 
(40.3%) 
15 0-1 0 (0-0) 15 
(4.9%) 
p<0.001*** 
No of days with other community team 18,570 0-182 0 (0-182)  1,228 0-182 
 
0 (0-0)  p<0.001*** 
No of episodes with street triage (other 
team pre, SWR post) 
5 0-3 0 (0-0) 2 (0.6%) 12 0-3 0 (0-0) 9 (2.9%) 
 
p=0.200 
No of days with street triage (other team 
pre, SWR post) 
6 0-5 0 (0-0)  39 0-16 0 (0-0)  p=0.085 
No of episodes with primary care mental 
health team 
22 0-2 0 (0-0) 19 
(6.2%) 
3 0-2 0 (0-0) 2 (0.6%) p=0.001** 
No of days with primary care mental 
health team 
1,365 0-182 0 (0-0)  293 0-182 0 (0-0)  p=0.005** 
No of inpatient admissions 24 0-6 0 (0-0) 15 
(4.9%) 
104 0-7 0 (0-0) 47 
(15.3%) 
p<0.001*** 
No of inpatient days 580 0-182 0 (0-0)  2,724 0-182 0 (0-0)  p<0.001*** 
No of inpatient days on section 10 0-3 0 (0-0) 6 (1.9%) 1,826 0-182 0 (0-0) 22 
(7.1%) 
p<0.001*** 
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Contacts with TEWV 
The number of people who had contact with TEWV services in the six months after their first 
contact with the STR street triage team increased to 156 (51%) from 166 (54%) in the six 
months prior to the first contact. However, although the total number of contacts with 
TEWV these people increased overall (figure 7.3), the length of time they spent in contact 
with TEWV staff did not change (figure 7.4). 
Figure 7.3 Change in number of contacts with TEWV 
 
Figure 7.4 Change in length of contacts with TEWV 
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Contact with crisis team 
The proportion of the sample who were in contact with the TEWV crisis team decreased 
from 25% (n=76) to 9% (n=28) in the six months following their initial contact with the street 
triage team. Both the number of episodes (figure 7.5) and the number of days open to the 
crisis team (figure 7.6) decreased for this sample after their initial contact with the SWR 
street triage service. 
Figure 7.5 Change in crisis team episodes 
 
Figure 7.6 Change in length of time spent with crisis teams 
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Contact with other community mental health teams 
The proportion of the sample who was in contact with another community mental health 
team (CMHT) decreased from 40% (n=124) in the six months before their first contact with 
SWR street triage to 5% (n=15) in the six months after. Both the number of episodes (figure 
7.7) and the number of days open to a CMHT (figure 7.8) significantly decreased after the 
first contact with the SWR street triage team. 
Figure 7.7 Change in number of episodes with CMHTs 
 
Figure 7.8 Change in number of days open to CMHTs 
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Contact with primary care mental health team 
The number of people in contact with a primary care mental health team decreased from 16 
(6%) to 2 (1%) after the first contact with SWR street triage. Both the number of episodes 
(figure 7.9) and length of time open to a primary care mental health team (figure 7.10) 
significantly decreased. 
Figure 7.9 Change in number of episodes with primary care mental health team 
 
Figure 7.10 Change in number of days open to primary care mental health team 
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Inpatient admissions 
The proportion of the sample who had an inpatient admission rose from 5% (n=15) to 15% 
(n=47) in the six months after the first contact with SWR street triage team in contrast to 
the previous six months. Both the number of admissions (figure 7.11) and the number of 
days spent as an inpatient (figure 7.12) significantly increased after the first contact with 
SWR street triage. 
Figure 7.11 Change in number of inpatient admissions 
 
Figure 7.12 Change in number of inpatient days  
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The proportion of the sample who spent time as an inpatient on a section of the Mental 
Health Act also significantly increased after the first contact with SWR street triage from 2% 
(n=6) to 7% (n=22). The length of time spent as an inpatient on section also significantly 
increased after the first contact with SWR street triage (figure 7.13). 
Figure 7.13  Change in number of inpatient days spent on section
 
Contact with liaison team 
The number of people in contact with the liaison team was very low (n=4 deceasing to n=2 
after contact with STR street triage), so changes over time were not statistically significant. 
Contact with street triage teams 
The number of people who had previously had a contact with another TEWV street triage 
team (n=2) and those who had a further episode with the STR street triage team (n=9) were 
low, so changes over time were not statistically significant. 
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8 Cross cutting themes 
This short chapter draws out a number of themes that emerged through the qualitative 
research strand, which point to broader issues around mental health and policing. The 
Street Triage pilot shed light on the themes of: 
 The changing role of policing 
 Risk assessment and risk management 
 The need for multiagency approaches to supporting this client group 
 Capacity and mental illness 
 
This chapter also reflects on the findings of the quantitative analysis and its implications for 
the NHS. 
8.1 The changing role of policing 
Street Triage was welcomed for the benefit it brought of taking mental health jobs away 
from the police and allowing them to get back to what were seen as their proper duties: 
It’s not really a police role, you know, we aren’t mental health professionals, we shouldn’t be 
there to babysit people because A&E can’t cope or they don’t have the staff to sit with 
people. And we have spent hours and hours and hours tied up with people [when] it’s not 
really our job, which means we can’t then do our job ... [Triage] is freeing up our time to let 
us get on with policing (police officer) 
However, there was also recognition that the role of policing was changing, with the 
traditional crime fighting focus being modified to incorporate a much greater remit around 
protecting vulnerable people and community welfare: 
The face of policing has changed and very much there’s less emphasis on chasing burglars 
and car thieves and punch ups in the town centres on a night time, to providing mental 
health and support and multiagency meetings, vulnerable people, Child Sexual Exploitation ... 
Now that’s very alien to traditional policing, and that change has happened very quickly over 
a matter of a year – two years, 18 months (police officer) 
While Street Triage was a valuable part of supporting this new remit, it was acknowledged 
that a cultural shift was also required within both operational policing and at the strategic 
level. Although supporting vulnerable members of the community had always been a 
fundamental part of the role of Safer Neighbourhoods teams, there was a view that this 
shift was more challenging for response officers, who were more accustomed to the 
traditional policing functions. There was a perception that among some response officers, 
there was still a desire to close down incidents quickly either as a s.136 detention or an 
arrest, without taking the time to engage with the individual or draw upon outside expertise 
such as Triage services.  
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The police service was seen to be in a period of transition in which mental health was now 
part of the role of operational policing but was an area in which front line officers did not 
yet feel confident. In the words of one participant, ‘mainstreaming mental health’ within 
policing work was now essential, with explicit recognition and support from the highest 
organisational level, so that officers could feel confident in embracing this aspect of the 
contemporary role. Reflecting on this issue, another officer noted: ‘It is a cultural shift. This 
isn’t about writing a strategy, this is about changing the culture of an organisation’. 
Officer training programmes were not felt to have kept pace with these changes in the front 
line policing environment; there was a need for more effective education in how to 
approach encounters with individuals in mental health crisis. Street Triage were seen to 
have already had an impact in beginning to broaden police understandings of mental health, 
but it was felt they could contribute much more. Potential inputs to officer training are 
discussed in Chapter 9.  
8.2 Risk assessment and risk management 
Partnership working between police officers and mental health nurses during the Street 
Triage pilot had brought to light differences in the approach that each service took to risk 
assessment and risk management. As has been discussed in earlier chapters, when faced 
with an individual in mental health crisis, police officers invariably worked on the basis of 
the ‘worst case scenario’ if an individual was expressing thoughts or intentions about self-
harm. Without specialist training, officers felt they could not risk ignoring such expressions 
and so needed to treat them as potentially genuine in all cases: 
I think the key ethos of policing nowadays is the management of risk, and it’s not necessarily 
in a particularly intelligent way that we manage that. Because when we look at risk ... we 
always look at what the worst possible thing that could happen is, and very rarely have the 
opportunity to take into account how likely that would be. Because every time you look on 
the news, it’s ‘The Police Fail Somebody Else’ so we’ve got that kind of Daily Mirror approach 
to risk: what happens if we don’t do something and something bad happens, then I’m gonna 
lose my job, I’m gonna lose my pension, possibly go to jail. So we respond at a very high level 
for pretty much everything (police officer) 
In contrast, Triage nurses were able to draw on their professional understandings of mental 
health presentations in making assessments of the likelihood that an individual would cause 
themselves harm. This had led to occasions where police officers had been surprised and 
sometimes rather concerned that a decision had been made to leave an individual in their 
home and not detain them to a place of safety: 
By the nature of the job that we do, we’re quite big on positive risk taking, whereas the 
police are quite risk averse, so it’s sometimes justifying why you’ve decided to leave that 
person in their home when they’ve just self-harmed, and saying “Well they are likely to self-
harm again, however this is a chronic presentation and it’s quite low risk really, the self-harm 
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that they do”. And it’s just [the police officers] getting their head round “Why would you 
leave somebody to self-harm again if you know that’s going to happen?”, or if people take 
overdoses regularly ... I think that they may have been surprised that we leave as many 
people at home (Triage team) 
I think the word ‘suicide’ is a really frightening word that people panic when they hear. I 
can’t think of many days, certainly not any weeks in my career when I’ve not heard it. And we 
have a very different view and we do look at therapeutic risk taking, and just because people 
have thoughts of suicide doesn’t make them a suicide risk (Triage team) 
There have been times where I’ve sort of thought Christ, you know, this job, you know, when 
it came in an hour or two ago, the report was that this person was likely to kill themselves 
and do this and that. And then all of a sudden Street Triage are like “They’re fine, we left 
them at home”, and you think “???” but obviously they’re the experts and they go off what 
they see (police officer) 
Triage nurses spoke of ‘therapeutic’ or ‘positive’ risk taking, an approach whereby 
individuals who have mental health problems are enabled  - within reason and based on a 
professional assessment - to take responsibility for their own risk-taking behaviours. This 
meant that mental health professionals may not always intervene and prevent the 
individual from carrying out certain potentially harmful behaviours. As one Triage team 
member explained:  
From a mental health point of view, you kind of reinforce behaviours if you’re responding in 
that way all the time. And so from the patient’s mental health wellbeing, the best thing to do 
is not respond. As long as the risk hasn’t changed and the presentation’s the same (Triage 
team) 
Whilst police officers participating in the research had observed the different approach to 
risk taken by the Triage nurses, this had not led to a change in their own practices in the 
absence of Street Triage. Street Triage had brought in a more expert level of risk 
assessment, but as yet this was not something that police felt equipped to implement 
themselves. Officers felt that without the input of a mental health professional, they would 
still need to err on the side of caution in crisis situations, detaining or at least remaining 
with the individual, given the weight of negative consequences which may occur should 
their assessment be incorrect. Far more education and deeper cultural change around 
approaches to risk were needed before officers would feel confident to make these types of 
decision without professional mental health input. 
8.3 The need for multiagency approaches to supporting this client group 
It was noted by several research participants that individuals assisted by Street Triage were 
often known to multiple services in the locality, for example, health, social care, housing, 
probation and substance use services. This reflects the fact that mental health problems 
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rarely occur in isolation and are frequently caused by or associated with other vulnerabilities 
or challenging social circumstances. 
What was clear from the experiences of the Triage team, police officers and other agencies 
participating in the research was that this was a ‘multiagency’ client group requiring 
coordinated partnership responses. Police officers recognised that their organisation had 
needed to change and become more receptive to partnership working, and that this cultural 
shift was now under way: 
We are becoming better at listening. We now know we can’t do it alone like we used to. And 
we did, we were a cellular organisation (police officer) 
I think we’re gradually getting to the stage where we realise we can’t solve everything 
ourselves and we have to have help (Inspector) 
Where Street Triage had been able to engage in multiagency meetings during the course of 
the pilot, this had been highly valued as the team not only brought direct mental health 
expertise but also served as a bridge or conduit to both police and wider health services. As 
will be discussed in Chapter 9, there was a desire among police and other agencies for the 
Triage team to become much more involved and embedded in multiagency activity in the 
locality. 
Recognition of the multiagency nature of the client group also raises broader questions 
about the remit of Street Triage, about who these clients ‘belong to’ and therefore about 
whom the service should be available to and who it should be funded by. These are ongoing 
questions that need to be addressed in a real and non-theoretical way by those involved in 
providing and funding the service. The wide range of situations addressed by Street Triage 
during the pilot year demonstrates that it is not a clear cut case of the service being 
primarily a gateway to secondary mental health provision. Although this was a pathway 
appropriate to a proportion of clients, other users of the service had variously required 
primary mental health referrals, referral to social services, signposting to non-statutory 
support of various types or diversion into a criminal or civil justice pathway. As such, a wide 
range of agencies stood to benefit from or be affected by Triage’s activity. The extent to 
which the service retains its unique partnership role with the police or alternatively 
broadens its remit, referral routes and (in turn) potential funding sources is something that 
warrants further strategic discussion. 
8.4 Capacity and mental illness 
The final cross-cutting theme to emerge from this research was the matter of capacity and 
mental illness. As has been noted in previous chapters, for the police and for other agencies 
whose clients were assisted by Street Triage, an important and valuable function of the 
service was to identify those cases where an individual did have capacity to understand their 
actions and therefore could reasonably be expected to face appropriate consequences. This 
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was important for the police in enabling them to address criminal behaviours, for the 
community safety team in dealing with antisocial behaviour and also for the Triage nurses in 
supporting individuals to take responsibility for their actions as part of a therapeutic 
pathway. Interestingly, whilst it may have been expected that police were more in favour of 
a prosecution route with Triage nurses advocating for leniency on mental health grounds, 
views expressed during the research suggested the opposite, with mental health nurses 
placing more emphasis on the importance of recognising capacity and responding 
appropriately: 
I think that the thing with the police is that they see somebody who’s got a mental health 
problem and they then don’t want to arrest them because they just automatically assume 
that that’s the cause of the behaviour. Whereas actually it’s less about the fact that they’ve 
got a mental health issue and more about whether they’ve got the capacity to understand 
what they’re doing, which on most occasions they actually have got the capacity and they 
sometimes do need to be dealt with by the police and not by mental health services (Triage 
team) 
Just because people have mental illness does not mean they’re not capable of committing a 
crime. And it’s a bit of an insult to suggest that they’re not [capable]. It is really quite 
discriminatory to suggest they’re not. The key thing for me is does the person have capacity, 
not do they have a mental illness. Because sometimes the mental disorder, the mental illness 
might be what’s influenced them to commit a crime, but there’s many time when it’s nothing 
to do with the act of crime. And they have capacity, and they should be dealt with in the way 
that everybody else should be dealt with, and mental health shouldn’t be a defence in those 
cases (Triage team) 
In essence, this comes back to the key point (discussed in Chapter 4) that the Triage service 
was providing a genuine triaging function, leading to a range of outcomes which may 
variously involve a combination of mental health, social support and/or criminal or civil 
justice pathways. 
8.5 The role of street triage within NHS mental health services 
The quantitative analysis of TEWV service use before and after an individual’s first contact 
with the SWR street triage team provides valuable data about the wider role of street triage 
within NHS mental health services. 
Firstly, our analysis supports the qualitative data that many of the people seen by street 
triage are already known to mental health services, though are not necessarily engaging or 
open to a team. Also, there are many who do not meet the criteria for secondary mental 
health services. It appears that SWR street triage effectively diverts people from community 
mental health services (crisis teams, CMHTs and primary care mental health teams) who do 
not require it. Street triage practitioners refer people to other appropriate services and 
appear to act as effective gatekeepers to community services. 
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Secondly, a small number of people seen by street triage subsequently require inpatient 
treatment for a mental health crisis. For these people, street triage is on their pathway to 
increased use of mental health services, which appears appropriate for their particular 
needs at that time. In this regard, the triage service appears to be effectively assisting 
people to obtain the treatment they require and diverting elsewhere those who do not. 
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9 Future Directions 
This chapter looks at research participants’ suggestions for ways in which the service could 
be developed and improved. Sections discuss: 
 Expanding referral routes 
 Changes to the operating base 
 Including paramedics in the team 
 Increased multiagency involvement 
 Involvement in court diversion and probation services 
 Training for police officers 
 Increasing service user and carer consultation 
 A countywide service 
It should be noted that many of the developments suggested below relied fundamentally on 
an increase in staffing numbers for Street Triage. The Triage team recognised that there was 
much more that they could – and would be keen to – contribute, particular in terms of 
multiagency activities, early intervention and training for police officers. However, they 
were currently unable to devote more time to this due to challenges of capacity to deliver 
even their basic remit, given reduced staffing. 
The chapter concludes with some thoughts about future evaluations of street triage which 
may address some of the limitations of this study. 
9.1 Expanding referral routes 
Some participants suggested that it would be useful if other services in addition to the 
police could make referrals into Street Triage, in particular the other emergency services of 
Fire and Ambulance. An example given was that the Fire service often encountered 
‘hoarders’ whose behaviours posed a fire safety risk but also indicated mental health 
problems. Social Services had also expressed interest in being able to make referrals to 
Street Triage.  
Echoing the benefits to the police, expanding referral routes would allow rapid access to 
professional assessment for clients of these other services, potentially diverting 
inappropriate referrals away from the Crisis team, community mental health teams and 
primary mental health care. Triage’s referral and signposting role would mean that 
individuals were more likely to get appropriate support whilst reducing pressures on other 
services: 
People do need an assessment, but actually what they need is an assessment by the right 
person, and not be put into a waiting list or a waiting pool, to be seen by a service that’s 
gonna see them for an hour and say “You’re not for us” (Triage team) 
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However, the point was raised that in considering the widening of referral routes, the 
distinct role and identity of Street Triage as a primarily a police partnership, would need to 
be retained. Street Triage did not want to risk becoming a duplication of social services or 
indeed the Crisis team. 
9.2 Changes to the operating base 
For the duration of the pilot, the SWR Triage team had operated out of an office at Cross 
Lane Hospital. However, a number of possible alternative operating bases were discussed by 
research participants, including police stations, the Force Control Room, and the 
multiagency ‘hub’ located at Scarborough Town Hall. 
Some participants saw advantages of Triage being based alongside officers in police 
stations. This would allow for a higher level of information sharing, more opportunities for 
informal cross-agency learning and would generally strengthen the working relationship 
between the two organisations:  
I think it would be really good for educating the police about mental health, just to have that 
close relationship, because we don’t have much time, really, to speak to the police during the 
assessments ... So I just think being in a closer proximity with the police would just improve 
relationships and help their understanding about mental health, and remind them that we’re 
here as well ... If we were there then they would be more likely to approach us about things 
and just get our opinion about people that they see quite often, and also to discuss people’s 
risks and people’s history (Triage team) 
Being based in a police station could also allow the Triage team to access Niche directly, 
both for information gathering but also to input their own job updates into the system, 
improving the level of detail and accuracy. However, the benefits of being co-located with 
the Crisis team (as at present) were also noted, and moving to a police-based location could 
mean the loss of some important connections: 
I’d be concerned that we’d lose our links particularly with Crisis team, cos we do an awful lot 
of information sharing between us and the Crisis team. They’ll tell us the people they’re 
concerned about or people that they’ve had to advise to phone the police because it’s 
emergency urgent risk. And equally we’re sharing information that “This person’s pitched up, 
you might see them in A&E later”. So I think if we were based with the police, we’d lose those 
connections and I think they are quite important connections (Triage team) 
The critical importance of facilitating access to the patient records system from any police-
based location was also re-emphasised. 
One suggestion was for the Triage team to have multiple operating bases, both in NHS and 
police premises, but it was recognised that this could be logistically difficult in practice. 
Additionally, there were some doubts that level of demand would be high enough in certain 
areas of the locality to warrant mental health nurses based in those local police stations: 
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You’ve got to weigh up the costs, haven’t you. You can’t have another team [in Whitby] 
because there’s just not that volume of incidents for them to deal with every day (police 
officer) 
The possibility of Triage being based in the Force Control Room was also discussed. This was 
seen to have advantages in providing on the spot access to mental health expertise and 
advice for control room staff and would again facilitate direct access to Niche. However, it 
again brought questions about logistics and effective use of resources. A short pilot had 
recently run in the City of York, where a Band 6 mental health nurse operated out of the 
Force Control Room for one 12½ hour period and was dispatched with an officer whenever 
a mental health incident was called in. This had worked well in the York locality. Speedier 
attendance at the scene was enabled through the use of a ‘bluelight’ police vehicle to 
transport the mental health nurse. The nurse was fully occupied throughout the shift and 
there were more incidents that could have benefited from their input had capacity allowed. 
However, it was recognised that the larger, more dispersed geography of the SWR locality 
and lower levels of demand could make this a less practical operating model for the SWR 
Triage service.  
A slightly different but closely related possibility, currently being investigated by the North 
Yorkshire Police, was to have a mental health nurse permanently located in the Force 
Control Room. The role of this nurse would be to access patient histories, provide 
information and guidance to Dispatch staff based on this information and on the details of 
the incident in progress, and to advise on whether the deployment of Street Triage, police 
officers, or both in tandem was the most appropriate response. In effect, this would bring 
the triaging stage one step forward, and could potentially contribute to even greater 
resource savings for the police where it was not deemed necessary to deploy an officer to 
the scene. 
There was strong support from some participants for the Triage team to join a number of 
other services based at a multiagency ‘hub’ that had been established at the Borough 
Council offices at Scarborough Town Hall. Services based in this office either on a 
permanent or flexible basis included ambulance, fire, housing associations, environmental 
and community departments of the local and county councils, schools, health, social care, 
drug and alcohol and domestic abuse services. A team of Safer Neighbourhoods officers and 
PCSOs had also recently relocated to have this hub as their main base.  
Collectively, this group was known as the Community Impact Team and its role focused on 
safety and problem solving in the community as well as focused multiagency work around a 
number of particularly challenging or ‘chaotic’ individuals. There was seen to be much 
overlap in client group between the Community Impact Team and Street Triage, and as 
such, it was felt that Triage would be a very valuable addition to this collaboration. Triage 
had provided input on individual cases, but there was a feeling that having them as a core 
part of the team would bring great benefits: 
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We’re actually missing a vital resource down here in this multiagency room ... We have all 
the agencies sitting down here, and [Triage] do come down here to meetings, but it would be 
so beneficial to have them down here as part of the team ... They’re so knowledgeable about 
things (police officer) 
What we don’t have on a day-to-day, and what we’d benefit from in the Community Impact 
Team, is someone sat alongside us ... It would be absolutely brilliant if [Street Triage] instead 
of being based somewhere else, was based within the team, because the individuals they’re 
dealing with are a lot of the ones that we’re dealing with. So it just makes sense to link it 
across really (multiagency respondent) 
Although representatives of mental health services attended the monthly Multi Agency 
Problem Solving meetings, the Community Impact Team had not yet succeeded in 
establishing a permanent mental health service presence in the office. Street Triage were 
seen as the team that could have particularly positive impact as they would not only bring 
mental health expertise, but also provide that information sharing bridge between the 
police and mental health services. As has been described in earlier chapters, for the 
Community Impact Team, benefits of closer links with a triaging service would be twofold, 
on the one hand engaging unwell individuals with appropriate mental health services, but 
also endorsing a civil justice pathway where it was established that an individual had 
capacity and understanding of their actions.    
On a practical level, the multiagency office was already equipped with police radio 
functionality, Niche access had been established for the Safer Neighbourhoods team now 
based at this multiagency office and it was felt that access to the patient records system 
would not be difficult to facilitate given that other offices within the Town Hall were already 
networked into this system. 
9.3 Including paramedics in the team 
Some Street Triage services across the country include a paramedic as an integral part of the 
response team. The inclusion of a paramedic in the SWR Triage team had been trialled for 
short period during the autumn of 2014, running over five weekend shifts. Summary 
outcome data provided by the ambulance service showed that: 
 The paramedic attended to ten patients with the Street Triage team 
 Reasons for the call included overdoses, suspected dementia, intoxication, and other 
mental health issues 
 No treatment was instigated on scene 
 One person was referred to A&E 
 No persons were referred to 136 Suite 
 Three persons were referred to Crisis team  
 One person was referred back to their carer 
 One person was taken home by police 
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 One person was admitted to hospital 
Advantages noted of having a paramedic alongside the Triage team were that cases of 
overdose could be established without (necessarily) requiring a trip to A&E and that if an 
individual needed to be taken to the Health Based Place of Safety under a s.136 detention, 
the paramedic could carry out the medical assessment at the scene, again avoiding a trip to 
A&E and enabling quicker transfer to the Place of Safety. However, although the paramedic 
had provided useful input in a small number of cases during the brief trial, there was a view 
among officers, the Triage team and the ambulance service that demand for medical skills 
would not be sufficient to justify the full time attachment of a paramedic to the team. For 
much of the trial period, the paramedic had been unoccupied: ‘just sat there and listening to 
the assessments ... they didn’t really have much of a role’.  
Alternative suggestions to bring this level of medical skill into closer working with the Triage 
service included having a direct line to community first responders or to include a registered 
(medical) nurse within the team. 
9.4 Increased multiagency involvement 
Street Triage was seen to have brought substantial improvements in multiagency working 
both between mental health services and the police but also with other agencies in the 
community whose remit and client group overlapped. It was also noted that both police and 
other agencies often struggled to get mental health service presence at their multiagency 
meetings and where Street Triage had been able to attend on occasions, this had been seen 
as greatly beneficial. Several suggestions were made as to how this positive start could be 
built upon with increased involvement of the Triage team in various multiagency activities. 
Opportunities to bring Street Triage more closely into the regular activities of police and 
other services included: 
 Resuming attending police daily briefings and duty tasking meetings 
 Attending the multiagency meetings which took place weekly in each of the Safer 
Neighbourhoods areas 
 Participating in multiagency ‘walkabouts’ which were conducted in targeted areas of 
the community 
 Attending Multi Agency Problem Solving (MAPS) meetings which took place monthly 
 Casual visits to one another’s operating base, for informal conversations and 
observations of routine working practices 
Involvement in this range of activities was seen to bring benefits to all parties, through 
mutual information sharing about particular individuals who were known to multiple 
services: 
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If we had people like that in these meetings, I’m sure that they’ll have something that they 
can share and tell us, and it would guide us (police officer) 
If we had a get together every so often ... like we have a housing association meeting 
regarding problem tenants and things like that, just so we have a meeting every so often so 
they could say “Look, these are the people that we’ve been called out to this month, this is 
what we’re doing with them, just in case you get called to them” (PCSO) 
We have a MAPS meeting every month and we discuss people who are targeted, vulnerable, 
at risk ... It would be really useful for them to come along to that, cos most of the people on 
our agenda have got mental health issues ... I bet they’ve got a wealth of information they 
could come along with. And it’ll help them, because then when they then go and deal with 
these people- cos I bet you, if you looked at the agenda for MAPS, I bet they’ve dealt with 
nearly every person on there (police officer) 
Becoming more involved in multiagency activity would also contribute to developing 
Triage’s early intervention work, taking their role beyond that of ‘responder’ to also 
becoming involved in more casework, supervision and guidance, and triaging of issues at the 
non-crisis point. 
One note of caution was raised however, in that officers did not want to lose the valuable 
service that Street Triage brought to the Response side of policing. There was a need to 
maintain a balance between being available to officers attending live incidents and 
becoming more deeply involved in longer-term community issues.  
9.5 Involvement in court diversion and probation services   
Street Triage was seen to be well placed to take on a role in court diversion, advising on 
alternatives to punitive measures where mental health problems were a significant factor in 
an individual’s offending behaviour. This was a service that did not currently exist in the 
SWR region and there was believed to be support from the magistrates’ court to develop 
such provision. There was also felt to be scope for the Triage team to contribute to 
probation work, where individuals released from prison came to the area and required 
assistance to bring together an appropriate package of social support. Once again, Triage’s 
input to such situations could helpfully contribute to a reduction in demand on secondary 
mental health services: 
We get quite a lot of people released from prison in York, and they’ve often got housing 
issues, so they’re put in emergency bed and breakfast in Scarborough. And they might have 
numerous mental health needs as well as substance misuse needs. They get referred into 
Crisis team routinely, whereas that would probably better fit with Street Triage ... Triage 
have a level of intelligence, because they’ve police radios, that Crisis team doesn’t have. So 
they have open airwaves, they have access to the information, and from a risk management 
point of view, these people don’t just fall under the health service’s responsibility. It’s the 
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police, probation, social care, housing. And Street Triage fits more nicely into that model 
(Triage team) 
9.6 Training for police officers 
Training in mental health for operational police officers was agreed to be minimal and 
largely ineffective in delivering useful knowledge and understanding of how to work with 
individuals experiencing mental illness. Officers commented that a lot of their awareness 
had been picked up through experiences on the job through trial and error in approaching 
situations and there were indications that officers could lack confidence in their ability to 
respond appropriately. Whilst officers noted the informal learning that had taken place 
through observing the Triage team in their work (see Chapter 5), there was much support 
for Street Triage to have an enhanced role in developing and delivering more formal officer 
training on mental health: 
I see the Street Triage service as absolutely essential in not just providing a service, but also 
helping our organisation as a police service actually learn about how to approach mental 
health, people on the ground who are in crisis in some way, and beginning to understand this 
whole issue of mental health without having had the formal training behind it (police officer) 
Going forward it would be nice if we could get training from the experts. I think that would 
be fantastic, because we go into these situations and we hope for the best really, that we’re 
not making things worse, or we’re not saying the wrong things for these people. But quite 
often we probably are saying the wrong things (police officer) 
That would be really helpful for us, because we have never had any training. We’ve learned 
the hard way - through it going wrong; through people kicking off; through “Actually that 
worked really well...” (police officer) 
Street Triage had already made some contributions to more formal officer training. A 
training day on mental health had recently been delivered for Force Control personnel, 
which had included a presentation by the Triage team. Comments from research 
participants who had taken part in this event indicated that it had been very well received. 
Suggested ways that Street Triage – and the mental health Trust more broadly – might 
contribute further to officer training in mental health included: 
 Student officers spending their one-week placements with the mental health Trust, 
potentially to include time spent with: Street Triage, Crisis team, CMHT, inpatient 
wards and primary care mental health 
 Student PCSOs spending their four-day placements with the mental health Trust, to 
include time spent with services as noted above 
 The Trust to produce an accessible guide to the different strands of mental health 
services, explaining the role and remit of each service, their times of operation and 
how to contact them 
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 Officers visiting the Triage team at their Cross Lane base on a casual basis, to have 
informal chats with the Triage team and observe them in their work 
 Co-location of services to enable informal learning and knowledge sharing 
 Training selected officers and PCSOs to become specialists in mental health 
 
With regard to the final point, however, it was noted that training officers to become 
mental health specialists would be a lengthy process (possibly taking years) and there were 
some reservations about establishing specialist roles as this would place the responsibility 
on a limited number of individuals, who may not always be available. Importantly, it was 
recognised that awareness and understanding of mental health was something that all 
officers needed to be engaged with and it would be better to develop a broad and universal 
understanding amongst all personnel rather than to focus on developing in depth 
knowledge among a limited set of individuals. 
 
Regarding the format of training, officers stressed that the programme needed to be 
personally delivered, rather than through a computer-based package as was currently the 
case. It was also important that it was delivered by a trained mental health professional and 
not somebody who was a professional ‘trainer’ but with no specific experience as a mental 
health practitioner.  
 
It was recognised by officers and Triage nurses that mental health is a broad and complex 
area, and that training would necessarily have to take a selective focus on key issues of most 
importance to the police. When asked what areas might usefully be covered, suggestions 
included:   
 
 Basic information about the presentation of different mental health conditions 
 What to say to people in crisis and how to say it 
 Recognising vulnerability and knowing who to call 
 Understanding appropriate use of s.136 and its implications 
 
The point was made that, for police officers, the important skill was in recognising the signs 
and knowing where to go, rather than becoming expert in delivering mental health 
intervention oneself: 
‘I don’t want folks to feel confident in being able to diagnose the difference between 
psychosis and depression. What we need to do is to be able to recognise that there’s a 
vulnerability there and know who to call’ (police officer). 
9.7 Increasing service user and carer consultation 
It was noted that increased communication with service users would be important as part of 
shaping the future direction of the service. A service user and carer consultation group was 
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brought together to provide feedback on experiences of Street Triage and met on one 
occasion during the pilot year, for a four hour event. With the confirmation of continued 
funding for the service (received in early summer 2015), plans were put in place for the 
consultation group to become more established and to meet bi-monthly from July 2015, 
facilitated by the Triage team’s Community Support Worker.  
9.8 A countywide service 
The vision of senior personnel within the police force and the NHS Mental Health Trust was 
for a countywide Street Triage service covering the entire Force area. Whilst the DH-funded 
SWR pilot was running, a separately funded pilot had also been launched in the City of York 
area, but there were still parts of the Force which did not benefit from Street Triage. 
Regarding the form that such a countywide service might take, it was noted that there 
should be streamlined access with single point of initial contact for all areas of the force, but 
that there would need to be flexibility in the operating model to account for variation in the 
geography of different areas of the region and also different population densities and 
characteristics. 
9.9 Future research 
This evaluation had some important limitations which need to be addressed in future 
research. 
Firstly, it was not possible to speak with users of street triage, or their carers, due to the 
limited time and resources available for this evaluation. While feedback was obtained 
indirectly through the user group and via street triage practitioners and police officers, 
further evaluations must include the voices of street triage users to ensure their experiences 
are related accurately. Their interpretation of both the qualitative and quantitative data 
discussed here would also add depth and a valuable perspective on our findings. 
Additionally, service users’ perceptions of their outcomes following contact with the SWR 
street triage team are missing from this evaluation and need to be captured in future 
research. 
Secondly, we had planned to obtain data on SWR street triage users from police Niche 
records, but there was insufficient time or resources available for the manual data 
extraction which was required. This would have helped us to understand changing patterns 
of contact with the police after first contact with the SWR street triage service in addition to 
its impact on TEWV service usage. Additionally, to obtain a full understanding of the impact 
of street triage on public services, data is required from the A&E department at 
Scarborough General Hospital, the ambulance service and North Yorkshire County Council 
social services department about these individuals. Data protection may make this process 
complicated, but linkage across records should be possible even if undertaken manually. 
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Thirdly, the way in which the data was recorded by the SWR street triage team changed 
during the course of the pilot, which made it more difficult to analyse. There were high 
levels of missing data, particularly in the outcome fields. This is a common problem with 
using routinely recorded data for evaluation purposes. Future research will benefit from 
prospective data collection by SWR street triage team practitioners which is appropriate for 
both clinical and research purposes. It is essential to ensure that practitioners are not over-
burdened by data collection and any proformas which are to be completed must be minimal 
and serve the dual purposes of clinical practice and evaluation. Ideally this will include 
measurement of outcomes important for service users and services alike such as mental 
wellbeing, goal attainment or recovery, for example. 
Fourthly, to move beyond descriptive analysis, it will be important to obtain data on a 
comparison cohort of people with mental health problems who come into contact with the 
police but not street triage. It was too difficult to obtain data on such a cohort in this small-
scale evaluation, but this should be the focus of future research to help us understand if the 
impacts are due to the contact with the police or the street triage team. 
Fifthly, although we have measured TEWV service use, a full economic evaluation of street 
triage is required which includes the costs of informal care and use of a full range of services 
such as primary care and social care. Ideally this will be in the context of an experimental or 
quasi-experimental study, though this is understandably difficult to design and implement in 
the context of a triage service. 
Finally, we have reflected on different models of street triage and considered if they might 
work for the SWR region. Future research needs to explore the comparative merits of these 
different models of street triage to weigh up their respective advantages and disadvantages 
(including outcomes and costs) to inform future policy and practice in North Yorkshire and 
beyond. 
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10 Conclusion 
This evaluation found near-universal praise for the SWR street triage service. We found it 
very difficult to elicit negative feedback about it, though the perspectives of service users, 
carers and family members are missing. 
Street triage was described as ‘the filling in the sandwich’, providing a bridge between police 
and mental health services. It was seen to enhance mental health provision in the SWR 
region by providing a service for people of all ages with no exclusion criteria. It appears to 
fill a gap in the mental health pathway in terms of sub-threshold presentations of mental 
distress and related social and emotional need. Further, it was apparent that although street 
triage was a brief intervention, it did not leave service users without advice or somewhere 
to go with their concerns, whether that be a new referral into mental health services, liaison 
with existing linked practitioners, signposting to broader social supports in the statutory or 
third sector, or some follow-up support from the team itself, for example. 
Street triage was described as a service that ‘prevents and avoids unnecessary escalation to 
admissions’. Its most significant impact appears to be a reduction in the use of community 
mental health services, though it is on the pathway to inpatient admission for a small 
number of people who require this. Its introduction was not associated with a reduction in 
s.136 detentions, but these appear to be already used sparingly in the SWR region where 
there is arguably no surfeit to reduce. 
There are some limitations in this evaluation including the lack of a control group and the 
perspectives of service users. These will need to be included in future research. However, 
there are very clear indications from the data collected and analysed for this evaluation that 
the SWR street triage team are providing an important service which brings benefits to both 
the police and the NHS. 
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